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KELLY v. LEE'S OLD FASHIONED HAMBURGERS: A
STEP BACK FROM CERTAINTY UNDER RULE 54(B)
INTRODUCTION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) is one of the most commonly used
Rules in complex federal civil litigation.1 Generally, Rule 54(b) allows a liti-
gant to immediately appeal a final judgment as to one or more, but less than
all, claims or parties in an action without awaiting the disposition of the entire
litigation.2 A partial final judgment under Rule 54(b), however, is appealable
only if the district court certifies the order.'
Modern federal courts have struggled to interpret Rule 54(b) consistently.'
More specifically, courts are divided over whether a district court must include
in its order the exact statutory language "no just reason for delay" to satisfy
the Rule's certification requirement.5 According to a literal reading of the
Rule, a district court's order must contain an "express determination that
there is no just reason for delay" of appeal and an "express direction for entry
of judgment" in order to be appealable.6 Nevertheless, some courts have liber-
ally construed the Rule and have instead looked to the intent of the trial court
to determine whether an order is appealable under Rule 54(b). 7
In Kelly v. Lee's Old Fashioned Hamburgers,8 the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals sat en banc to resolve this controversial issue. The court adopted a
substance-over-form approach to finality under Rule 54(b).1 It ruled that an
order is appealable under Rule 54(b) so long as the reviewing court can deter-
mine that the district court "unmistakably intended" to issue a partial final
judgment pursuant to the Rule.10 Accordingly, the court held that the district
court need not include any precise language in its Rule 54(b) order."
1. Jacqueline Gerson, The Appealability of Partial Judgments in Consolidated Cases, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 169, 176 (1989).
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b); see also Craig E. Stewart, Note, Multiple Claims Under Rule 54(b):
A Time for Reexamination, 1985 B.Y.U. L. REV. 327 (discussing Rule 54(b) in depth).
3. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., 446 U.S. 1 (1980). The district court's deter-
mination thht there is "no just reason for delay" of appeal is generally referred to as "certifying"
or a "certification of" a Rule 54(b) order. See Gerson, supra note 1, at 177.
4. See infra notes 163-95 and accompanying text (noting the current controversy among fed-
eral courts concerning proper Rule 54(b) certification).
5. See infra notes 174-248.
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
7. See infra notes 190-95 and accompanying text (describing the liberal interpretation of Rule
54(b)).
8. 908 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
9. Id. at 1220.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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This decision greatly affects federal practice for several reasons. First, a
broad application of Kelly may open the door for sanctions and malpractice
actions against attorneys who incorrectly predict the district court judge's in-
tent regarding finality.'5 Second, the decision clearly illustrates the impracti-
cality of a case-by-case approach to jurisdictional rules.18 Finally, it may sig-
nal a more relaxed approach toward interpreting appealability under Rule
54(b)."1
This Note begins with a Background section that reviews the history and
development of Rule 54(b) and its certification requirement. The next section
discusses the Fifth Circuit's decision in Kelly. The Analysis section then illus-
trates how the majority's liberal interpretation of Rule 54(b) misinterpreted
the language and purpose of the Rule. Finally, the Impact section explains
how the Kelly decision may lead to several unpalatable results: 1) confusion
among attorneys concerning the appealability of orders; 2) more attorney
sanctions and malpractice actions stemming from this confusion; and 3) the
potential for an increased crowding of an already overburdened appellate
docket.
I. BACKGROUND
The history and development of Rule 54(b) provide a background for the
Fifth Circuit's decision in Kelly v. Lee's Old Fashioned Hamburgers. The
Background section begins by examining the basic principles and purposes of
the final judgment rule. Next, this section discusses the single judicial unit
theory"5 and its relationship to the final judgment rule. This section then illus-
trates how the original Rule 54(b) was promulgated to moderate the some-
times harsh effects of the single judicial unit theory. The Background section
next describes how the problems that courts and litigants encountered with the
original Rule led to the 1946 Amendment to Rule 54(b) that included the
certification requirement. Finally, this section illustrates how modern federal
courts have interpreted Rule 54(b) inconsistently with regard to the certifica-
tion requirement.
A. The Final Judgment Rule
At early common law, a party to a suit did not have an absolute right to
appellate review. 6 The traditional view was instead that the United States
12. See infra notes 407-12 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility of an increase in
attorney malpractice actions).
13. See infra notes 379-89 and accompanying text (explaining the difficulty of applying the
"unmistakable intent" test for determining the appealability of an order).
14. See infra notes 163-73 and accompanying text (noting that many federal circuits now re-
quire a statement of reasons to accompany a Rule 54(b) order).
15. See infra notes 76-88.
16. 6 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE $ 54.01 [1] (2d ed. 1989) [herein-
after MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE). For example, there was no general right to appeal in criminal
cases for over one hundred years. See Symposium, Federal Civil Appellate Jurisdiction An Inter-
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Constitution did not create such a right. 7 The belief was that the Framers
instead decided to leave that matter to Congress.18
Congress, however, created an intermediate federal appellate court system.19
Congress granted jurisdiction to the court of appeals in 28 U.S.C. § 1291
("section 1291"), which states in pertinent part: "[T]he courts of appeals...
shall have original jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district
courts of the United States."2 Since the courts of appeals are inferior courts
created by Congress, their jurisdiction is completely dependant on statutory
authority. 1 Accordingly, unless a party can bring an appeal under one of the
alternative bases for jurisdiction,22 the courts of appeals have jurisdiction only
over "final decisions" of the district courts.23 This is commonly referred to as
locutory Restatement, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 19 (1985).
17. Symposium, supra note 16, at 16.
18. See Wiscort v. Dauchy, 3 U.S. (1 Dall.) 321, 327 (1796).
19. See generally 13 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§
3502-3504 (2d ed., 1984) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER] (discussing the development of the
intermediate federal appellate system).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988) (emphasis added).
21. See Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394, 399 (1957) ("It is axiomatic . . . that the
existence of appellate jurisdiction . . . is dependant upon authority expressly conferred by stat-
ute."); Wiscort, 3 U.S. at 327 ("If Congress has provided no rule to regulate our proceedings, we
cannot exercise an appellate jurisdiction."); see also Gialde v. Time, Inc., 480 F.2d 1295, 1298
(8th Cir. 1973) (stating that courts of appeals have jurisdiction only as conferred by statute).
Certain constitutional foundations, however, have been suggested as limits on congressional power
over appellate jurisdiction. See Symposium, supra note 16, at 20 (suggesting that express prohibi-
tion of governmental action, separation of powers, and the nature of the judicial function in gen-
eral operate as limits on congressional power); see also William W. Van Alstyne, In Gideon's
Wake: Harsh Penalties and the "Successful" Criminal Appellant, 74 YALE L.J. 606, 613 n.25
(1965) (suggesting that congressional power may be constrained by due process); see generally
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV..1362 (1953) (arguing that Congress' power to control
appellate jurisdiction has eroded).
22. The most common alternative statutory basis for jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)
(1988), which provides for review of interlocutory orders in various circumstances. See generally
15 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 19, § 3901 (1st ed., 1976) (listing all of the alternative juris-
diction federal statutes). For a discussion of why Federal Rule 54(b) is not an "alternative" juris-
dictional statute, see infra notes 132-37 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., Bachowski v. Usery, 545 F.2d 363, 366 (3d Cir. 1976) (stating that "[tlhe cases
are clear in their command that only final decisions of the district court are appealable under [28
U.S.C. § 1291]"); Childs v. Kaplan, 467 F.2d 628, 629 (8th Cir. 1972) (stating that appellate
jurisdiction arises exclusively from final judgments); see also Susan C. Robasca, Comment, The
Finality of Partial Orders in Consolidated Cases Under Rule 54(b), 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 637,
637 (1989) ("[Dietermining when a judgment is final is critical because the right to appeal de-
pends on it.").
Furthermore, courts of appeals have a duty to determine sua sponte whether they have appel-
late jurisdiction before they reach the merits of a case. See Patten Sec. Corp. v. Diamond Grey-
hound & Genetics, 819 F.2d 400, 403 (3d Cir. 1987) (noting that even where the parties agree
that the court has appellate jurisdiction, their agreement does not relieve the court of the responsi-
bility to independently determine appealability); Borne v. A & P Boat Rentals No. 4, 755 F.2d
1131, 1133 (5th Cir. 1985) ("It is axiomatic that- parties may not stipulate appellate jurisdiction,
[and the appellate courts] are obligated, sua sponte if necessary, to examine the basis of [their]
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the final judgment rule.24
The final judgment rule embodied in section 1291 serves several purposes .2
The most important purpose of the rule is to conserve judicial resources by
avoiding piecemeal appeals.2 1 Courts consistently recognize that constant in-
terruption of trial through piecemeal appeals would "consume trial court time,
forestall the ultimate resolution of the case, and facilitate the harassment of
one party by his opponent. '27 Consequently, courts consistently express their
abhorrence of piecemeal appeals, and express their approval of the efficiencies
inherent in the final judgment rule.2 8
The final judgment rule also serves other purposes. First, it promotes respect
for the trial court's decisions.29 Second, the final judgment rule gives the trial
court time to reconsider its rulings.30 Third, the rule preserves the possibility
jurisdiction."); see also Preston T. Tawber, A Uniform Approach to Determining Finality in
Bankruptcy Appeals Under 28 U.S.C. Section 158(d), 29 S. TEXAS L. REV. 587, 592 (1988) (com-
menting that it "is the duty of the federal [appellate] court to examine, as a threshold issue prior
to reaching the merits of a case, whether it has jurisdiction to hear or dispose of the particular
litigation."). But see In re Bassak, 705 F.2d 234, 234-35 (7th Cir. 1983) (arguing that the obliga-
tion to determine jurisdiction before reaching the merits of a case is becoming "unduly wasteful of
judicial time").
24. See 15 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 19, § 3905 (1st ed., 1976).
25. Fort v. Roadway Express, 746 F.2d 744, 748 (11th Cir. 1984) (noting that a number of
policies are furthered by the final judgment rule).
26. See Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 264 (1984) (emphasizing that the final judg-
ment rule is "crucial to the efficient administration of justice."); In re Sambo's Rests., 754 F.2d
811, 815 (9th Cir. 1985) ("[O]ne of the most compelling reasons for the finality rule is the avoid-
ance of unnecessary appeals and interruptions of trial, thereby saving judicial time and expense.");
see also United States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202, 1207 (5th Cir. 1977) ("The desire for judicial
economy and the avoidance of unnecessary piecemeal appeals underlie the final judgment rule."),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 968 (1978).
27. Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 HARV. L. REV. 351, 358 (1961); see also
Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 264 (expressing the notion that "[the final judgment rule] reduces the
ability of litigants to harass opponents and to clog the courts through a secession of costly and
time consuming appeals"); Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 234 (1945) (supporting the
notion that the final judgment rule eliminates delays caused by interlocutory appeals); Cobbledick
v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325-26 (1940) (noting that "[t]o be effective, judicial administra-
tion must not be leaden-footed" with a succession of separate appeals); Newpark Shipbldg. &
Repair v. Roundtree, 723 F.2d 399, 401 (5th Cir. 1984) ("The finality rule is designed to avoid
piecemeal trials."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 818 (1984); Julie M. Hamlin, Comment, Entry of
Judgment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Third Circuit Imposes a Requirement of
Reasons, 56 B.U. L. REV. 579, 581 (1979) (noting that "[a] succession of separate appeals inter-
rupts the trial, delays resolution of the controversy and interferes with the efficient use of judicial
resources").
28. See Bermudez v. Smith, 797 F.2d 108, 110 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that piecemeal appeals
are detrimental to the policy of judicial economy); Bachowski v. Usery, 545 F.2d 363, 373-74 (3d
Cir. 1976) (noting the "deeply-held distaste" for piecemeal litigation).
29. See Richardson-Merrill, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 436 (1985) (noting that the final
judgment rule enhances the authority of district court judges); Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 263 (ac-
knowledging that the final judgment rule preserves the deference due trial judges).
30. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 827 F.2d 868, 871 (2d Cir. 1987); see also In re Delta
Servs. Indus., 782 F.2d 1267, 1271 (5th Cir. 1987) (dismissing an appeal because "review should
not ordinarily occur before it is clear that the judge has no further intention of further considering
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that the case may settle, thus making appeal unnecessary.8" Finally, the final
judgment rule helps the appellate court to dispose of the appeal on its merits
once the case is properly appealed. 8
The term "final decision," however, is not defined in the United States
Code." The most commonly articulated definition of finality was espoused by
the Supreme Court in Catlin v. United States.s3 In Catlin, Justice Rutledge's
majority opinion defined a final decision as "one which ends the litigation and
leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment."35 While some
courts defined a final decision differently, 6 most courts have accepted Justice
Rutledge's definition of the term. s7
Despite its seemingly clear definition, courts struggle to apply the final judg-
ment rule consistently. The difficulty in applying the rule exists primarily
because courts are divided over whether to give the rule a practical or techni-
cal interpretation. 9 The practical approach4 ° to finality rejects a technical and
rigid interpretation of the final judgment rule.41 Instead, this approach com-
mands the court to balance in each case the inconvenience of piecemeal review
the challenged ruling").
31. See 15 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 19, § 3907, at 431 (1st ed., 1976) (noting that the
final judgment rule may provide interim time sufficient for the parties to compromise and settle).
32. Taylor v. Board of Educ., 288 F.2d 600, 602-03 (2d Cir.), later proceeding, 294 F.2d 36
(2d Cir.) (noting that the appellate court is in a better position to assess the wisdom of the trial
court's rulings when it has the entire record to consider), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961).
33. United States v. Agne, 161 F.2d 331, 332 (3d Cir. 1947) (noting that "the statute does not
define what is a 'final decision'").
34. 324 U.S. 229 (1945).
35. Id. at 233.
36. Some earlier cases formulated a very similar definition of a final decision stating that a
decision was final if "the rights of the parties have been fully and finally determined." Bebbe v.
Russell, 60 U.S. 283, 284 (1856). For other definitions of the term, see Southern Ry. v. Postal
Tel. Cable Co., 179 U.S. 641, 643 (1901) (holding a final order is one that "dispos[es] of the
whole case and adjudicat[es] all the rights, whether of title or of damages, involved in the litiga-
tion"); Hatzenbuhler v. Talbot, 132 F.2d 192, 194 (7th Cir. 1942) (equating "final" with "conclu-
sive"); 4 CIS. Appeal and Error § 94(a) (1989) (explaining that a final judgment concludes all
rights of the parties).
37. See, e.g., Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 199 (1988) (quoting the
Catlin definition of a final decision); Koke v. Phillips Petroleum, 730 F.2d 211, 215 (5th Cir.
1984) (same). For a detailed list of other cases that have adopted this formulation, see 15
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 19, § 3909, at 440 n.3 (1st ed., 1976).
38. See United States v. Garner, 632 F.2d 758, 761 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting that "the ease with
which the finality rule is stated ... belies the difficulty of its application"), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
923 (1981); see also McDonald v. Schweiker, 726 F.2d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 1983) (explaining that
the term "final judgment" does not have a fixed meaning); Parker v. United States, 153 F.2d 66,
69 (lst Cir. 1946) (emphasizing that the court has not "always understood what constitutes a
'final decision' ").
39. See 15 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 19, § 3909 (1st ed., 1976).
40. This approach has also been called the pragmatic approach to finality. See Brown Shoe Co.
v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 306 (1962).
41. See 15 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 19, § 3913, at 522 (1st ed., 1976) (stating that
under the pragmatic approach, "the finality requirement should not be applied as a sterile
formality").
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on one hand against the danger of denying justice on the other."2
The most prominent case to adopt the practical approach to finality was
Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp."s In that case, Gillespie brought suit for
the wrongful death of her son as the administrator of his estate under the
Jones Act." Gillespie also sued under the Ohio wrongful death statute.' The
district court, however, entered an order that struck all references to the Ohio
wrongful death statute.' 6 Gillespie appealed the part of the court's ruling that
limited the scope of her complaint. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, while
noting that the question of finality was "close," accepted the appeal and af-
firmed the trial court's ruling.' 7
The Supreme Court held that the trial court's decision was final under sec-
tion 1291 .48 The Court first noted that previous courts struggled to clearly
define when a judgment is final for purposes of appeal.' 9 The Court then rea-
soned that "[blecause of this difficulty ... the requirement of finality is to be
given a 'practical rather than technical construction.' "5o The Court held that
in interpreting the finality requirement practically, it is necessary to balance
the inconvenience and cost of piecemeal review against the danger of denying
justice.51 The Court concluded by holding that "we cannot say that the Court
of Appeals chose wrongly [by accepting the appeal] under the
circumstances. 52
While a few subsequent courts accepted this pragmatic approach to final-
ity,"' most modern courts reject the doctrine54 and limit Gillespie to its facts. 55
42. See Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 150. The Jones Act provided a recovery for seamen and their families for death or
injury at sea. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982).
45. Gillespie, 379 U.S. at 150.
46. Id. The court also ruled that no reference could be made regarding recovery for the benefit
of the decedent's brothers and sisters. Id.
47. Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 321 F.2d 518, 521-22 (6th Cir. 1963), af'd, 379
U.S. 148 (1964). Although the court of appeal's rationale for accepting the appeal is somewhat
unclear, one possible reason is that the appeal had to be accepted "in the proper administration of
justice." Id. at 522.
48. Gillespie, 379 U.S. at 148.
49. Id. at 152. The Court acknowledged that its "cases have long recognized that whether a
ruling is 'final' within the meaning of § 1291 is frequently so close a question that decision of that
issue either way can be supported with equally forceful arguments, and that it is impossible to
devise a formula to resolve all marginal cases coming within what might well be called the 'twi-
light zone' of finality." Id.
50. Id. (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)).
51. Id. at 152-53 (citing Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950)).
52. Id. at 153. The Court also stated that "in light of the circumstances .... the Court of
Appeals properly implemented the same policy Congress sought to promote in § 1292(b) by treat-
ing this obviously marginal case as final and appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291." Id. at 154.
53. See, e.g., American Export Lines v. Alvez, 446 U.S. 274 (1980) (citing Gillespie in support
of its "pragmatic" approach to finality); Vaughn v. Mobil Oil Expl. & Prod. Southeast, 891 F.2d
1195, 1197 (5th Cir. 1990) ("[Tlhe Supreme Court has consistently emphasized that ... a 'prac-
tical rather than a technical construction' best serves the policies underlying the purposes of the
finality requirement."); United States v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 638 F.2d 899, 902-04
1991] CERTAINTY UNDER RULE 54(B) 263
These courts reason that finality should be governed by "bright-line" rules in
order to provide a relatively clear test of appealability.56 Some modern courts
also emphasize that ad hoc decisions ascribing reviewable finality to techni-
cally non-final decisions disorganize practice by encouraging attempts to seek
or oppose appeals.57 The Supreme Court most recently adopted this bright-line
approach in Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co.58 In Budinich, the Court
addressed the issue of whether a decision was final although the district court
had not yet made a determination of attorney fees.59 Justice Scalia held that
the district court order was final under section 1291. 60 In adopting this abso-
lute rule, Justice Scalia emphasized that "bright-line rule[s] preserve ... oper-
ational consistency and predictability in the overall application of section
1291."Ol
The tension, however, between the two doctrines still exists.62 In fact, the
(5th Cir.) (applying the Gillespie balancing approach), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 892 (1981); Fox v.
City of West Palm Beach, 383 F.2d 189, 192-93 (5th Cir. 1967) (holding that "the validity of the
district court's order in denying to appellant the right to assert a claim ... was fundamental to
the further conduct of the case, and hence has such attributes as to bring it within Section 1291").
54. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 476 (1978) (ruling that the "concept of
finality" is "no longer a viable theory"); see also Newpark Shipbldg. & Repair v. Roundtree, 723
F.2d 399, 405 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (stating that "pragmatic finality" is "in fundamental conflict
with the values and purposes of the finality rule"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 818 (1984); United
States v. Garner, 632 F.2d 758, 761-62 (9th Cir. 1980) ("The courts' efforts to give the [finality]
rule a practical rather than a technical construction has led to some rather curious results."), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 923 (1981).
55. The most prominent case that has limited Gillespie to its facts. is Coopers & Lybrand v.
Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978). In Coopers & Lybrand, the Court listed four factors that made
Gillespie unique to its facts: 1) the case was "marginally final"; 2) it afforded an opportunity to
dispose "of an unsettled issue of national significance"; 3) the decision served the same policy
sought to be promoted by 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); and 4) "the arguably final issue had not been
presented to this Court until argument on the merits, thereby ensuring that none of the policies of
judicial economy would be achieved were the case sent back with the important issue undecided."
Id. at 477 n.30. Accordingly, the Court concluded that "if Gillespie were extended beyond the
unique facts of that case § 1291 would be stripped of all significance." Id.
56. See, e.g., First Nationwide Bank v. Summer House Joint Venture, 902 F.2d 1197, 1199
(5th Cir. 1990)(emphasizing the need for "bright-line" jurisdictional rules); Harcon Barge Co. v.
D & G Boat Rentals, 784 F.2d 665, 670 (5th Cir. 1986) (expressing the need "to have 'guides
sufficiently clear to prevent protective appeals and litigation over appellate jurisdiction'" (quoting
15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3913 (1976))), cert. de-
nied, 479 U.S. 930 (1986).
57. Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181 (1955); New York v. S & E
Shipping Corp., 568 F.2d 887, 893 (2d Cir. 1977).
58. 486 U.S. 196 (1988).
59. Id. at 201. The Court first decided that, under the Erie doctrine, federal law controls the
rules of decisions if they are controlled by federal statute. Id. at 198.
60. Id. at 202. Justice Scalia reasoned that "we have been willing in effect to split the 'merits'.
from a related claim for delivery of physical property." Id.
61. Id. The Court also stated that "[c]ourts and litigants are best served by the bright-line
rule." Id.
62. One court has aptly stated:
[T]he Supreme Court's treatment of the finality doctrine seems to vacillate between
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Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently sat en banc to decide this issue in
Newpark Shipbuilding & Repair v. Roundtree.63 In that case, Roundtree was
injured on his first day at work for Newpark.6" Roundtree filed a claim for
worker's compensation, and Newpark appealed the Benefit Review Board's de-
cision to remand the case to the administrative law judge to redetermine his
appropriate weekly wage.6" The Fifth Circuit panel had noted that the circuit
had adopted the pragmatic approach to finality in a previous case.66 Accord-
ingly, the court determined the Board's order to be final after balancing the
relevant considerations. 67
A rehearing was granted before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals en
banc.68 The majority of the court reversed the panel decision.6 9 The court first
noted that the Gillespie decision was limited to its unique facts by Coopers &
Lybrand.70 It thus rejected the "case-by-case" methodology that the panel
used to determine finality." In doing so, the court stated that the value of
"occasionally permitting reviewable pragmatic finality to Board remand orders
is outweighed by its erosion of the values of the finality rule mandated by
Congress."72 Accordingly, the court applied the technical approach to finality
and held that only Board decisions that "ended the litigation on the merits"
were final.73
The courts of appeals derive their power to hear appeals from section
1291 .7 Section 1291 requires that only "final decisions" of the district courts
may be reviewed by the courts of appeals. Section 1291, however, does not
provide a definition of the term "final decisions." The appellate courts, left to
dual approaches: on the one hand, suggesting that a final judgment is one that com-
pletely ends the litigation on the merits, on the other hand, eschewing such a rigid
requirement of finality while reaffirming the importance of the rule.
Freeman v. Califano, 574 F.2d 264, 267 (5th Cir. 1978).
63. 723 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1984) (en bane), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 818 (1985).
64. Roundtree, a welder, fell from a barge resulting in his injury and subsequent disability.
Newpark Shipbldg. & Repair v. Roundtree (Newpark 1), 698 F.2d 743, 745 (5th Cir. 1983),
review dismissed, 723 F.2d 399, 401 (5th Cir. 1984) (en bane).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 746 (citing Litton Systems v. White, 681 F.2d 275, 279 (5th Cir. 1982)).
67. Id. The court ruled that jurisdiction did not depend on a "single formula or a simple rule."
Id. Rather, the court expressed the view that this inquiry requires a weighing of "piecemeal re-
view on the one hand, and the danger of denying justice by delay on the other." Id. (citations
omitted).
68. 706 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 818 (1984).
69. Newpark Shipbldg., 723 F.2d at 407.
70. Id. at 408.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 407.
73. Id. at 401-05. The dissent criticized the majority for "retreat[ing] from justifiable flexibility
in the law [of finality] to a rigid rule which disserves the interests of justice." Id. at 407 (Wil-
liams, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the Supreme Court had not abandoned Gillespie
and that "[w]e should not fear a 'case-by-case' approach ... when it is narrowly confined." Id. at
408-10.
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988).
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define the content of a final decision, continually split on the issue of whether
to apply a practical or a technical approach, despite the Supreme Court's deci-
sion to follow a technical approach in Budinich.15 With this lack of consensus
in mind, federal courts have turned to other judicial theories for clarity on the
appealability of decisions.
B. Single Judicial Unit Theory
Although courts struggled to define the parameters of finality, the common
law "single judicial unit theory" helped courts apply the final judgment rule.7"
This theory basically states that a judgment is not final and appealable unless
it resolves the entire action as to all of the parties and claims.77 In other
words, even if a district court order completely disposes of separate claims or
parties in a lawsuit, the order is not final until the entire litigation is com-
plete.78 Under the single judicial unit theory, courts essentially view an entire
action as a single "unit of disposition."'7' The basic purpose of the single judi-
cial unit theory, like that of the final judgment rule, is to further the policy
against piecemeal review.80
The single judicial unit theory was adequate when almost all of the litiga-
tion in the federal courts followed the "two-party-single-cause paradigm." 8'
Accordingly, most federal courts generally followed this theory.82 Some courts
75. 486 U.S. 196, 199 (1988).
76. See Marvin H. Lewis, Comment, Review in the Federal Courts Under 54(b); The Effect of
Multiple Parties, 2 UCLA L. REV. 545, 546 (1955) (noting that at the same time the final judg-
ment rule matured there developed a single judicial unit concept based on the idea that a record
was entire and could not be severed).
77. Metcalfe's Case, 11 Coke Rep. 38, 77 Eng. Rep. 1193 (K.B. 1615); see also James A.
Matthews, III, Recent Development, Federal Civil Procedure-Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)-A Two-
Part Analysis for the Exercise of a Trial Judge's Discretionary Certification as Final Under Rule
54(b) When a Counter Claim Remains Pending, 25 VILL. L. REV. 179, 180 (1979) ("At common
law, it was clearly established that a judgment was not final and appealable unless it completely
resolved all of the issues raised in the lawsuit.").
78. See Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 370 (1919) (holding that a "final decision requires the
termination of lawsuit"); see also Robert J. Banta, Comment, Appealability Problems in Ne-
braska: Advantages of Federal Rule 54(b), 53 NEB. L. REV. 73, 74 (1974) ("At the early common
law an action was a single judicial unit even though it contained multiple claims or multiple
parties ... [and] could be appealed only as a single judicial unit.").
79. Gerson, supra note 1, at 174 ("Common law courts deemed an entire action to be an appro-
priate unit for appellate review."); Eldon E. Fallon, Note, Federal Procedure-Multiple
Claims-Federal Rule 54(b), 35 TUL. L. REV. 444 (1961) (commenting that an action at early
common law had to be "adjudicated in its entirety before a judgment was final for purposes of
appeal").
80. Hamlin, supra note 27, at 582.
81. 10 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 19, § 2653, at 20 (1st ed., 1971); see Fallon, supra note
79, at 444 (stating that application of the single judicial unit theory in the federal courts
"presented relatively few problems so long as the action itself remained simple in construction").
An example of a two-party-single-cause paradigm is where one plaintiff sues one defendant under
one cause of action.
82. Matthews, supra note 77, at 180.
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did formulate a few well defined exceptions to the single judicial unit theory.8
Most courts, however, applied these exceptions only in rare situations where
strict "application of the judicial unit theory would result in irreparable hard-
ship to the litigant.84
The single judicial unit theory was strained further, however, when the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated in 1938.88 The new Federal
Rules included several provisions for liberal joinder of parties and claims.8 6
This liberalization of federal practice greatly increased the "danger of hard-
ship and denial of justice if each issue must await the determination of all
issues."87 Consequently, some power to render split or separate final judgments
became imperative to avoid this injustice that occurred in more complex
litigation ."
C. Original Rule 54(b)
In order to prevent the hardship resulting from an appeal being delayed,
many experts began to feel that some final decisions on fewer than all of the
claims should be appealable without awaiting a final decision on all of the
claims.89 Accordingly, Congress and the Supreme Court promulgated the orig-
inal Rule 54(b) in 1938, which stated in pertinent part:
83. Generally, the three exceptions to the single judicial unit theory that developed at common
law were: 1) the "Forgay Exception"; 2) the "Collateral Matter Exception"; and 3) the "Proce-
dural Incident Exception." See Note, Federal Rule 54(b) & the Final Judgment Rule, 28 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 203, 204-07 (1953) (providing a more detailed discussion of the three exceptions to the
single judicial unit theory),
84. See e.g., Bebbe v. Russell, 60 U.S. 283, 287 (1856) (limiting the "Forgay" doctrine to its
facts); Hohorst v. Hamburg Am. Packet Co., 148 U.S. 262 (1893) (refusing to apply the "Collat-
eral Matter" exception); Shapiro v. Bonanza Hotel Co., 185 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1950) (narrowly
construing the "Procedural Incidents" exception).
85. In 1935, the Supreme Court appointed an Advisory Committee to draft the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. See Order Appointing Committee to Draft Unified System of Equity and Law,
295 U.S. 774 (1935). The Rules became effective in September, 1938. See Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 308 U.S. 645, 766 (1938).
86. These provisions include Rule 18, which allowed joinder of claims and remedies, FED. R.
Civ. P. 18; Rule 20 on permissive joinder of parties, which authorized unlimited joinder of actions
between a single plaintiff and defendant and the joinder of any number of claims and parties when
there was a common question of law or fact, FED. R. Civ. P. 20; Rule 13, which provided for
compulsory and permissive counterclaims and also allowed a defendant to file a cross-claim
against a co-defendant, FED. R. Civ. P. 13; and Rule 24 which allowed extensive intervention, FED.
R. Civ. P. 24. See also Lewis, supra note 76, at 548 n.15 (discussing the interplay between Rules
13, 14, 18, 20 and 24).
87. Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950); Matthews, supra note
77, at 180 ("Since the new Rules allowed greater latitude in the joinder of parties and claims,
hardship might result if a partial claim, which would be final and ripe for appeal if sued on alone,
could be held in abeyance pending the adjudication of the other, perhaps unrelated, claims.").
88. MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 16, 11 54.22 (noting that in complex litigation "if
nothing could be decided with finality until everything was decided, the purpose of bringing it in
and sorting it out for efficient disposition would largely be vitiated").
89. Id. 9 54.20 (stating that it is "necessary that the Rules contain some directive relative to
the disposition of separate units of litigation").
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JUDGMENT AT VARIOUS STAGES. When more than one claim for
relief is presented in an action, the court may at any stage, upon a determi-
nation of the issues material to a particular claim and all counterclaims...
enter judgment disposing of such claim. The judgment shall terminate the
action with respect to the claim so disposed of and the action shall proceed
to the remaining claims .. ..
According to the drafters, the Rule's purpose was to avoid the injustice that
occurred when a litigant had to delay his appeal of a distinctly separate claim
until the entire action was completely litigated."'
Generally, the original Rule 54(b) allowed a party to appeal a final judg-
ment on one or more, but less than all, claims in a multi-claim action.9 2 The
Rule thus essentially altered the single judicial unit theory by changing the
"unit of disposition" from an entire action to any distinctly separate claim or
compulsory counterclaim. 9 However, the original Rule 54(b) only affected
multi-claim, not multi-party actions. 9' Furthermore, the Rule still required the
district court to render a "final judgment" on the separate claim or counter-
claim. 9  Thus, the original Rule 54(b) modified the single judicial unit theory
but did not impede the use of the final judgment rule. 9 6
Several problems arose, however, in interpreting the language of original
Rule 54(b). One major problem was that neither of the terms marking the
boundaries of the rule-a "claim for relief" and all "compulsory counter-
90. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (1938).
91. See Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure in Report of Proposed Amendments
to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, 5 F.R.D. 433, 472 (1946)
[hereinafter 1946 Committee Notes]. The drafters adopted the Rule "in view of the wide scope
and possible content of the newly created 'civil action' in order to avoid the possible injustice of a
delay in judgment of a distinctly separate claim to await adjudication of the entire case." Gerson,
supra note 1, at 169. In addition, the drafters realized that some claims within an action would
become ripe for review before resolution of the entire action and that the affected parties would
endure hardship if they had to wait to appeal. Thus, the drafters decided that the dimensions of
the action as filed would no longer determine the unit of disposition. Id.
92. 10 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 19, § 2653, at 20 (1st ed., 1971).
93. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 434 (1956); see also Wilber A. Brucker,
Jr., Comment, No Appeal Allowed Under Rule 54(b) When Separate Claim Not Final, 51 MIcH.
L. REv. 300, 302 (1952) (noting that Rule 54(b) changed the old "judicial unit" in a way that
allows a party to appeal from a claim, counter-claim, cross-claim or third-party claim); 10
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 19, § 2653, at 20 (1st ed., 1971) ("Rule 54(b) was included to
alter the judicial unit theory and embrace the notion of the adjudication of a single 'claim' as a
basis for the entry of a judgment.").
94. MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 16, 1 54.20 (noting that while the original version
of Rule 54(b) continued to embrace the single judicial unit theory where multiple parties were
involved it rejected that theory in cases involving separate and distinct multiple claims).
95. See Sears, 351 U.S. at 432 (holding that "sound judicial administration" required adher-
ence to the standard of finality in the adjudication of individual claims for purposes of
appealability).
96. Id. The validity of the amended Rule 54(b) was challenged. See Pabellion v. Grace, 191
F.2d 169, 174 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting the unquestioned validity of the original Rule); MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 16, 54.20 (same); infra notes 132-37 and accompanying text
(same).
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claims"-had fixed determinations. 97 Courts often gave the scope of these
terms widely varied interpretations without ever clarifying the distinctions. 8
Consequently, it became apparent that separating multiple claims for purposes
of appeal was inherently difficult. 99
In addition to this difficulty, another serious problem with the original Rule
54(b) was that the litigants had no reliable way of determining whether a
district court had issued a final order.1"' First, the district courts had no duty
to expressly state that its judgment was final.101 Furthermore, even if they did
make such determinations, the courts of appeals would often set them aside. 0 s
The reviewing court would instead apply general principles of finality to decide
whether a separate claim was appealable.'08
Because of this ambiguity litigants often had no idea of whether to appeal a
district court order that did not dispose of the entire case in a complex ac-
tion.104 A party would often face the following dilemma: immediately appeal
an order where finality was possible and run the risk of having it dismissed; or
proceed with the remaining action and risk losing the right of review because
the time for the appeal may lapse. 105 Most litigants protected themselves
97. MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 16, 54.23; see also Matthews, supra note 77,
at 445-46 (noting that the confusion surrounding the meaning of "claim" and "counter-claim"
caused uncertainty in the application of Rule 54(b)).
98. Compare Collins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 1939) (tak-
ing a broad view of the term "claim" by holding that a claim for a copyright infringement was
separate from an unfair competition claim) with Atwater v. North Am. Coal Corp., 11l F.2d 125,
127 (2d Cir. 1940) (holding that a district court order dismissing two of four counts based on
alternative theories was not appealable). See generally MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note
16, $ 54.24 (detailing the problems courts encountered while trying to define a counterclaim).
99. Sears, 321 U.S. at 434. In Sears, the Court stated that "it was soon found to be inherently
difficult to determine by any axiomatic standard of unity which of several multiple claims were
sufficiently separable from others to qualify this relaxation of the unitary principal in favor of
appealability." Id.
100. MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 16, 54.23; 10 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
19, § 2653, at 21 (1st ed., 1971); Hamlin, supra note 27, at 583 (noting that the original Rule
provided no guidance as to what constituted a final judgment).
101. MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 16, 11 54.25; see Gerson, supra note 1, at 175
(noting that "district courts simply issued the partial judgments without saying anything about
finality").
102. MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 16, V 54.23[1]; see also Audi Vision v. RCA
Mfg. Co., 136 F.2d 621, 623 (2d Cir. 1943) (holding that finality "is a matter for the appellate
court to decide, whatever may have been the view of the trial court").
103. MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 16, 1 54.23(11].
104. See Note, supra note 27, at 583 (commenting that it was not clear to the parties whether
a judgment disposing of fewer than all the claims before the court was a final judgment appropri-
ate for appeal).
105. 10 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 19, § 2653, at 21-22 (1st ed., 1971); see MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 16, T 54.23[1]; Lewis, supra note 76, at 495.
A party could lose its right to appeal if it decided to risk that an order was not final under the
original Rule because an appeal must be brought within thirty days of final judgment. 28 U.S.C. §
2107 (1988); see also infra notes 395-400 and accompanying text (discussing the risk of untimely
appeal and the potential for dismissal of the appeal).
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against losing their right of review by appealing any order that potentially
could have been final under Rule 54(b). 106 Consequently, many needless and
fruitless appeals delayed litigation and crowded the appellate court dockets. 107
D. Amended Rule 54(b)
In order to rectify the difficulties experienced under the original Rule 54(b),
the Supreme Court in 1946 organized a committee to amend the Rule. 10 8 The
purposes of the amendment were: 1) to reduce the number of needless appeals
from partial disposition; 2) to reduce uncertainty in determining when a final
judgment under Rule 54(b) had been entered; and 3) to eliminate the distinc-
tion between compulsory and permissive counterclaims." 9 After the committee
proposed several drafts, 1 it finally adopted an amended Rule 54(b) in
1946.111 The amended Rule provided that a district court could issue a partial
final judgment under Rule 54(b) "only upon an express determination that
there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for entry
of judgment." '  This is generally referred to as the "certification"
requirement.' 3
106. See MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 16, 54.23[1] (acknowledging that
"[p]arties could be expected to err on the side of caution"); see also 1946 Committee Notes,
supra note 91, at 47 (explaining that "situations arose where district courts made a piecemeal
disposition of an action and entered what the parties thought amounted to a judgment ... [and]
parties did not know their ultimate rights, and accordingly took an appeal, thus putting the final-
ity of the partial judgment in question"); Gerson, supra note 1, at 175 (commenting that "uncer-
tain litigants almost always appealed partial judgments to make sure that they did not sleep on
their appeal rights"); Glen A. Smith, Federal Rule 54(b) and Oregon's Multiple Claim and Mul-
tiple Party Litigation, 54 OR. L. REV. 161, 167 (1975) (noting that "cautious litigants immedi-
ately appealed decisions on all claims to insure against unexpected expiration of the time for
appeal"). •
107. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 426, 434 (1956). As the Sears court
noted, the volume of appellate proceedings increased dramatically because lawyers thought it pru-
dent to take immediate appeals in doubtful cases. Id.; see also MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE,
supra note 16, 54.25 (recognizing that parties often made "fruitless appeals" causing considera-
ble waste of time, effort and expense).
108. See MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 16, 54.27.
109. Id. 54.27[2-2].
110. For the text of the proposed amendments, see id. $ 54.26[2].
111. The amended Rule 54(b) read as follows:
JUDGMENT UPON MULTIPLE CLAIMS. When more than one claim for relief is
presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party
claim, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment upon one or more but less
than all of the claims only upon an express determination that there is no just reason
for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of
such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however desig-
nated, which adjudicates less than all the claims shall not terminate the action as to
any of the claims, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any
time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims.
FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (emphasis added).
112. Id.
113. See Gerson, supra note 1, at 170 n.4.
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According to the Supreme Court, the reason that the drafters included the
certification requirement in the amended Rule was to provide litigants with
certain criteria to determine whether an order was final for Rule 54(b) pur-
poses." 4 In fact, the Court in Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp.16
stated that the obvious purpose of the certification requirement was
to reduce as far as possible the uncertainty and the hazard assumed by a
litigant who either does or does not appeal from a judgment .... It provides
an opportunity for litigants to obtain from the District Court a clear state-
ment of what that court is intending with reference to finality, and if such a
direction is denied, the litigant can at least protect himself accordingly. 116
The amended Rule thus attempts to "strike a balance between the undesirabil-
ity of more than one appeal in a single action and the need for making review
available in multiple-party or multiple-claim situations at a time that best
serves the needs of the litigants."' 1 7
In theory, requiring the district court to make an express determination that
there is "no just reason for delay" before entering a Rule 54(b) order should
completely eliminate any doubt as to whether the order is appealable." 8 The
amended Rule 54(b) explicitly commands that the time for appeal begins to
run from the entry of an order that meets the requirements of the Rule." 9 The
Rule thus accomplishes the desired predictability because it makes clear when
a litigant must pursue his or her appeal. ° Accordingly, until recently, the
amended Rule 54(b) generally has worked well in practice. 2 '
114. Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 512 (1950). According to one
commentator:
The last sentence of the 1946 amended Rule, providing that absent an express deter-
mination that there is no just reason for delay and express direction for entry of judg-
ment, all decisions adjudicating less than all claims remain interlocutory, was calcu-
lated to serve the Committee's first objective-reducing the number of appeals-but
it was also directed at furthering the second objective of reducing the uncertainty in
identifying an appealable judgment.
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 16, 54.27[2-2]; see also. Gerson, supra note 1, at 176
(stating that the committee added the certification requirement to provide certainty for litigants).
115. 338 U.S. 507 (1950).
116. Id. at 512.
117. FSLIC v. Tullos-Pierremont, 894 F.2d 1469, 1475 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting 9 WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 19, § 2645 (lst ed. 1971)).
118. 10 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 19, § 2653, at 25-26 (1st ed., 1971); see also MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 16, 1 54.27[2.-2] (stating that the "requirement of the express
determination and direction" gives the litigant protection against losing the right to appeal).
119. 10 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 19, § 2653, at 25-26 (2d ed., 1983).
120. Id.
121. Id. ("The 1948 Amendment did much to obviate the difficulties experienced under the
Rule."). The only major revision since 1946 was the addition of multi-party actions to the Rule.
Id. The text of Rule 54(b) as it reads today is:
JUDGMENT UPON MULTIPLE CLAIMS OR INVOLVING MULTIPLE
PARTIES.
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved,
[Vol. 41:257
CERTAINTY UNDER RULE 54(B)
E. Practice Under Rule 54(b)
Two Supreme Court opinions outline Rule 54(b)'s application in modern
practice.'22 In Mackey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Mackey filed a six-count
complaint against Sears claiming interference with his business activities.' "
The district court struck Counts one and two of the complaint without leave to
amend.2 The court also found that there was no just reason for delaying
appeal on these issues and thus directed judgment to be entered against the
plaintiff.125 Mackey appealed the order dismissing Counts one and two of his
complaint on the grounds that he could have stated a claim for relief had the
court allowed him to amend his complaint.'2 Sears moved to dismiss the ap-
peal on the ground that the order and judgment appealed from was not final
under 28 U.S.C. section 1291.127
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals first determined that this case forced
it to interpret the amended Federal Rule 54(b). 12 8 It then noted that there was
a split among the federal circuits as to whether a district court's certification
of a Rule 54(b) order automatically conferred jurisdiction upon the court of
appeals. " The court decided that the opinions holding that a district court's
the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as one or more but fewer than all
of the claims or parties only upon an express direction that there is no just reason for
delay and upon an express determination for the entry of judgment. In the absence of
such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however desig-
nated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer
than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties,
and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the
entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the
parties.
FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
122. See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1 (1980); Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427 (1956).
123. The first count of the complaint alleged a violation of the Sherman and Robinson-Patman
Acts; the second count alleged an intentional destruction of Mackey's lamp business; the third
count alleged that Sears induced one of Mackey's customers to breach a contract; the fourth count
alleged that Sears was participating in unfair competition; the fifth count alleged a Robinson-
Patman action against Time Saver Tools, Inc., which was wholly owned by Mackey's; and the
sixth count alleged that Sears' entire predatory program was actionable at common law. Mackey
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 218 F.2d 295, 296 (7th Cir. 1955), affid, 351 U.S. 427 (1956).
124. The court also struck the fourth count, but granted Mackey leave to amend. Id. Mackey
abandoned the fifth count of the complaint on his own motion. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. The court noted that the First and Third Circuits held that the effect of a Rule 54(b)
order rendered conclusive the issue of finality. Id. at 298 (citing Bendix Aviation Corp. v. Glass,
195 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1952), and Boston Medical Supply Co. v. Lea & Febiger, 195 F.2d 853
(1st Cir. 1952)). Conversely, the court noted that the Second and D.C. Circuits had adopted the
view that the appellate court had its own duty to determine jurisdiction and that such jurisdiction
could not be controlled by the findings of the district court judge. Id. (citing Flegenheimer v.
General Mills, 191 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1951), and Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 209 F.2d 802 (D.C.
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entry of a final judgment under Rule 54(b) conclusively determined finality
were the better reasoned decisions.1 80 The court rejected the argument that the
Rule was invalid because the certification under Rule 54(b) "indirectly af-
fected" appellate jurisdiction."" Accordingly, the court dismissed Sears' mo-
tion to dismiss the appeal.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the case.' 32 After reviewing
the history of Rule 54(b), 3' the Court explicitly rejected Sears' argument that
the amended Rule made an unauthorized extension of appellate jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.'1" The Court held that, as to distinctly separate
claims in an action, a district court cannot treat as final that which is not
already final under section 1291.185 Instead, the Court stated that under the
amended Rule 54(b), the district court may in its discretion "release for ap-
peal final decisions upon one or more, but less than all, claims in multiple
claims actions."'3 6 Accordingly, the Court in Sears concluded that the revised
Rule 54(b) operates within the constraints of finality prescribed by section
1291.137
The Court in Sears also outlined the proper relationship between the district
and appellate courts in the Rule 54(b) procedural framework. 3 8 It held that
under the revised Rule, the district court's role is that of a "dispatcher."' 3 9 In
other words, the district court decides when each final decision upon each
claim is ready for appeal in the interest of sound judicial administration. 40
Cir. 1954)).
130. The court was especially persuaded by the fact that Judge Clark and Professor Moore,
who had participated in the drafting of the amended Rule, adopted this position. Id.
131. Id. at 299.
132. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 348 U.S. 970 (1955).
133. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 432-35 (1956).
134. Id. at 436.
135. Id. at 437; see also Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Eng'g & Foundry Co., 351 U.S.
445, 453 (1956) (stating that the rule "applies only to a final decision of one or more claims for
relief'). The Court also rejected Sears' argument because the claims that the district court dis-
missed were "sufficiently independent" of the other claims in the complaint to satisfy the original
Rule 54(b). The Court thus concluded that "[i]t is nowhere contended today that a decisi6n that
would have been appealable under the original rule is not also appealable under the amended rule,
provided the District Court makes the required certification." Sears, 351 U.S. at 436.
136. Sears, 351 U.S. at 437.
137. Id. at 438. As the concurring opinion pointed out, however, the Court did not really decide
whether the district court's determination of finality is conclusive. Id. at 439 (Frankfurter &
Harlan, J.J., concurring) ("The Court could have said that Rule 54(b)'s requirement of a certifi-
cate from a district judge means that the district judges alone determine the content of finality.
The Court does not say that."). Justices Frankfurter and Harlan opined that it was the courts of
appeals who must ultimately decide whether a decision as to a separate claim was final. Id. at
443-44; see also MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 16, 54.28 ("Where a judgment has
been entered in compliance with the Rule, the court of appeals has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1291 unless ... the district court has treated as 'final' that which is not 'final' within the meaning
of the statute.").
138. Sears, 351 U.S. at 435.
139. Id.
140. See id. (holding that the district court "is permitted to determine, in the first instance, the
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The Court also decided that the courts of appeals should review trial court
decisions to "dispatch" a Rule 54(b) judgment under an abuse of discretion
standard." 1 Finally, the Supreme Court in Sears recognized that the "nega-
tive effect '142 of Rule 54(b) adequately limits the number of appeals in a
multi-claim action and reaffirms the traditional federal policy against piece-
meal appeals.1 3
Despite this seemingly clear direction from the Court in Sears, federal
courts began to dispute the proper relationship between the district and appel-
late courts regarding whether a separate claim was "ripe" for appeal., 4 The
Supreme Court set out to resolve this difficulty in Curtiss-Wright Corp. v.
General Electric Co. 45 In that case, Curtiss-Wright, a subcontractor, brought
an action containing several claims against the general contractor, General
Electric.14 Although most of the claims were based on fraud and misrepresen-
tation, three of the claims sought payment from General Electric on the out-
standing balances due on the subcontracts."" The district court granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of Curtiss-Wright on the contract claims., 8 The
district court also directed that the judgments were final under Rule 54(b) and
stated its reasons for holding that there was "no just reason for delay of
appeal." '"19
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed General Electric's appeal on
the ground that in its view, there was no just reason for delay. The court
stated that "certification should be the exception rather than the rule.' 50 It
further stated that "in the absence of unusual or harsh circumstances, we be-
lieve that the presence of a counterclaim ... weighs heavily against the grant
appropriate time when each final decision' upon 'one or more but less that all' of the claims in a
multiple claims action is ready for appeal").
141. Id. at 437.
142. Id. at 438. As the Court stated: "By its negative effect, [the Rule] operates to restrict in a
valid manner the number of multiple claims actions." Id. The "negative effect" of Rule 54(b) is
the manner in which the Rule operates to allow an appeal from an order only where the district
court certifies the order under Rule 54(b). See MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 16,
54.30[1].
143. Sears, 351 U.S. at 438.
144. See, e.g., United Bank of Pueblo v. Hartford Accident & Indem., 529 F.2d 490 (10th Cir.
1976) (misapplying the abuse of discretion standard).
145. 446 U.S. 1 (1980).
146. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 597 F.2d 35 (3d Cir. 1979), vacated, 446 U.S.
1 (1980).
147. Id. The parties entered into 21 subcontracting agreements to build component parts for
propulsion systems on nuclear vessels for about $215 million dollars. Id.
148. Id. at 36.
149. Id. The district court's rationale for deciding that there was "no just reason for delay" of
appeal were: 1) the certification would not result in duplicative appeals because the contract
claims were totally distinct from the other claims; 2) none of the proceedings in the district court
would moot the appeal of the contract claims; and 3) Curtiss-Wright would suffer daily financial
losses from its inability to achieve a greater return on the $19 million dollar judgment than the six
percent interest authorized by law. Id.
150. Id.
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of 54(b) certification."'' The court thus held that Rule 54(b) certification was
improper because there were no "harsh circumstances" that warranted Rule
54(b) certification. 1 2
The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' decision.188 The Court
first reaffirmed the Rule 54(b) framework set forth in Sears.'' It held that a
district court "must first determine that it is dealing with a final judgment"
with regard to a separate party or claim. 185 The Court also stated that the
district court is to act as a dispatcher and determine whether there is any just
reason for delaying the appeal of the final decision.'86
The Court then rejected General Electric's argument that a district court
may only issue a Rule 54(b) judgment in an "infrequent harsh case."' 57 In-
stead, the Court reiterated the Sears approach and stated that the decision to
order a Rule 54(b) judgment rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. 88
The Court reasoned that this standard best furthered the purpose of the Rule
because the trial court is in the best position to evaluate the factors relevant to
a decision that there is "no just reason for delay."'8 9 The Court also held,
however, that an appellate court has a duty to review the district court's evalu-
ation of the factors relevant to certifying a Rule 54(b) order. 60 Nevertheless,
the Court held that the reviewing court should disturb the district court's deci-
sion only if it was clearly unreasonable. 6 ' Accordingly, the Supreme Court
vacated the court of appeals decision and remanded the case for proceedings
consistent with its standards for appellate review.' 6 2
151. Id. (citing Allis-Chalmers v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1975)). See
infra notes 164-71 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of Allis-Chalmers.
152. Curtiss-Wright, 597 F.2d at 36. The court held that Allis-Chalmers precluded the court
from holding that Curtiss-Wright's potential use of the money was a "harsh circumstance." Id.
153. Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 13.
154. Id. at 7.
155. Id. (stating that the judgment "must be a 'judgment' in the sense that it is a decision upon
a cognizable claim for relief, and it must be 'final' in the sense that it is 'an ultimate disposition of
an individual claim entered in the course of a multiple claims action.' ").
156. Id. at 8.
157. Id. at 10. General Electric relied on the following statement in the 1946 Committee notes:
"[T]his rule needed only the exercise of a discretionary power to afford a remedy in the infrequent
harsh case to provide a simple, definite, workable rule." Id. at 9 (quoting 5 F.R.D. 433, 473
(1946) (emphasis added)). The Court stated:
However accurate it [the statement in the Committee Notes] may be as a description
of cases qualifying for Rule 54(b) treatment, the phrase "infrequent harsh case" in
isolation is neither workable nor entirely reliable as a benchmark for appellate review.
There is no such indication it was ever intended by the drafters to function as such.
Id. at 10.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. (stating that the Sears Court indicated "that the standard against which a district
court's exercise of discretion is to be judged is the 'interest of sound judicial administration'"
(quoting Sears. 351 U.S. at 437)).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 13.
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Modern federal practice concerning Rule 54(b), as displayed in Sears and
Curtiss-Wright, consists of two distinct stages. First, the district court "dis-
patches" the claims that are final judgments to the appellate court. The ac-
companying order is then reviewed by the court of appeals under a "clearly
unreasonable" standard. Under this standard, only those Rule 54(b) orders
that must clearly await further proceedings of the district court are rejected
for appeal. Unclear from these decisions, however, is what substantive matter
the reviewing court must consider under this standard.
F. The Statement of Reasons
Although the Supreme Court effectively illustrated the roles of the district
and appellate courts under Rule 54(b),183 one issue it did not resolve is
whether a district court must include a statement of its reasons why there "is
no just reason for delay." The first major case that directly addressed this
question was Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Philadelphia Electric Co."" In Allis-
Chalmers, the district, court granted summary judgment in favor of Allis-
Chalmers' complaint, before it adjudicated Philadelphia Electric's counter-
claim. 65 The court certified its judgment under Rule 54(b), but it did not
include any reasons in the order that may have formed a basis for this
conclusion."'
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals stated that it must first determine
whether it had jurisdiction to hear the Rule 54(b) order.167 In making that
determination, the court stated that "a proper exercise of discretion requires a
trial court to do more than just recite the 54(b) formula of 'no just reason for
delay.' "168 It thus determined that the district court should "clearly articu-
late" the reasons underlying its decision to grant Rule 54(b) certification. 9
The court reasoned that the statement of reasons was essential because it
would give the appellate court some basis for determining whether the district
163. See supra notes 122-62 and accompanying text.
164. 521 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1975).
165. Id. Allis-Chalmers sued to recover payment due for three of the eight transformers that it
sold to Philadelphia Electric. Philadelphia Electric admitted the amounts claimed by Allis-Chal-
mers, but it asserted a set-off and a counterclaim that, if established, would exceed the amounts
claimed by Allis-Chalmers. Id. at 362.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 363.
168. Id. at 364.
169. Id. The court also set forth several factors that district courts should use to determine
whether there is "no just reason for delay" of appeal: 1) the relationship between the adjudicated
claims and the unadjudicated claims; 2) the possibility that the need for review might or might
not be mooted by future developments in the district court; 3) the possibility that the reviewing
court might be obliged to consider the same issue a second time; 4) the presence or absence of a
claim or counterclaim that could result in set-off against the judgment sought to be made final;
and 5) miscellaneous factors such as delay, economic and solvency considerations, shortening of
the time of trial, frivolity of competing claims, expense, and the like. Id.; see generally 10
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 19, § 2659 (2d ed., 1983) (discussing in detail the factors that
trial courts should apply when determining that there is no just reason for delay).
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court abused its discretion in granting a partial final judgment.17 0 Therefore,
after Allis-Chalmers, a district court in the Third Circuit was required to set
forth the reasons for its conclusion that there was "no just reason for delay";
those five words alone would be insufficient to effectuate proper Rule 54(b)
certification.171
Other federal circuits struggled for a period of time in deciding whether to
make the statement of reasons mandatory or optional. 172 Today, an increasing
number of circuits require their district courts to include a statement of rea-
sons with their Rule 54(b) certification.1 7 1
G. Proper Language of Certificate
In addition to the debate over whether district courts should be required to
include a statement of reasons in their Rule 54(b) certification,1 7 modern fed-
eral courts are divided over whether a proper certified Rule 54(b) order must
include the phrase "no just reason for delay. 175 Courts were nearly unani-
mous in their belief that absent proper certification, any order in a multiple-
party or multiple-claim action was not final under Rule 54(b).17 1 Very few
cases, however, addressed the question of whether the district court was re-
170. Allis-Chalmers, 521 F.2d at 364.
171. See, e.g., Cemar, Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 897 F.2d 120, 123 (3d Cir. 1990) (dis-
missing Rule 54(b) appeal because the district court certification lacked a statement of reasons).
172. Local P-171, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Thompson Farms Co., 642 F.2d 1065, 1072
n.8 (7th Cir. 1981).
173. See Auriemma v. City of Chicago, 906 F.2d 312, 314 (7th Cir. 1990) (requiring district
court judges to give reasons for their determinations); Solomon v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 782 F.2d
586 (6th Cir. 1986) (stating that the "district court must do more than just recite the Rule 54(b)
formula of 'no just reason for delay' "); Frank Briscoe Co. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 776 F.2d
1414, 1416 (9th Cir. 1985) ("The trial court should not direct for entry of judgment under Rule
54(b) unless it has made specific findings setting forth the reasons for its order."). Contra Mooney
v. Frierdich, 784 F.2d 875, 876 (8th Cir. 1986) (declining to make a statement of reasons
mandatory); Pahlavi v. Palandjian, 744 F.2d 902, 905 (1st Cir. 1984) (not imposing "a rigid
requirement on the district court to prepare a written statement in every case to justify its Rule
54(b) actions"). For further support for the statement of reasons requirement, see Hamlin, supra
note 27, at 591-92.
The Fifth Circuit held in Rothenberg v. Security Management Co., 617 F.2d 1149 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 954 (1980), that it does not require a statement of reasons. The court
reasoned that the statement of reasons is left to the discretion of the trial court because "Rule
54(b) contains no specific requirement that a district court include a statement explaining its
reasoning for applying the rule." Id.
174. See supra notes 164-71 and accompanying text (discussing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Phila-
delphia Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1975), in which the court discussed whether district
courts must include a statement of reasons in their Rule 54(b) certification).
175. This, of course, is a classic form versus substance controversy. See Crowley Maritime
Corp. v. Panama Canal Comm'n, 849 F.2d 951, 953 (5th Cir. 1988) (declining to adopt a form-
over-substance approach). Most of the debate on this subject has taken place in the Fifth and
Seventh Circuits.
176. See, e.g., Mooney v. Frierdich, 784 F.2d 875, 875-76 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating that an
"order dismissing a third-party complaint which is not certified by the district court under Rule
54(b) is not a final appealable order").
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quired to include the precise language of the Rule in a Rule 54(b)
certificate. 17
Many courts that have recently dealt with this issue have held that the Rule
54(b) order itself must at least contain the Rule's express language of "no just
reason for delay."1 7 8 The leading case adopting this view is Glidden v. Chro-
malloy American Corp.179 In that case, Glidden brought a class action suit to
recover retirement benefits under an employment benefit welfare program. 180
The district court granted summary judgment on the merits prior to its deci-
sion on the class certification.181 Glidden appealed the decision on the
merits.1 82
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that it did not have jurisdiction
to hear the appeal. The court first decided that the decision on the merits was
not a "final decision" under section 1291.189 The court then held that the dis-
trict court's order was not final under rule 54(b) because the district court did
not make "an express determination that there was no just reason for de-
lay."' 84 It stated that the operation of Rule 54(b) is mechanical. 8 ' The court
stated that this construction was necessary because "the clarity of the rule
would be destroyed by a principle that the judgment is appealable when the
district court's opinion, as opposed to the judgment, shows that the court con-
177. Traditionally, courts simply demanded without further explanation that the district court's
order be clear. See David v. District of Columbia, 187 F.2d 204, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (requiring
the district court to enter a Rule 54(b) judgment "in a definite, unmistakable manner"); see also
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 16, 54.41[11] ("Whatever the mechanics for putting
the fact of compliance with Rule 54(b) on the record, it must appear that the court has made an
express determination that there is no just reason for delay."). But see Republic of Italy v. De
Angelis, 206 F.2d 121, 132 (2d Cir. 1953) (Clark, J., concurring) (suggesting that although the
trial judge may not make a finding of finality in the very words of the Rule, if he does so in a clear
manner an appeal will nevertheless lie).
178. Glidden v. Chromalloy Am. Corp., 808 F.2d 621, 623-24 (7th Cir. 1986); see Willhelm v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 927 F.2d 971, 973 (7th Cir. 1991); Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cincin-
nati TV 64 Ltd., 845 F.2d 674, 676-77 (7th Cir. 1988); see also In re Narowetz Mechanical
Contractors, Inc., 898 F.2d 1306, 1308 n.4 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that an order was not a final
judgment "because it omitted the talismanic words required by Rule 54(b)"); Mooney v.
Frierdich, 784 F.2d 875, 875-76 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding certification must substantially comply
with the mandatory language of the Rule); Frank Briscoe Co. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 776 F.2d
1414, 1416 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that a valid 54(b) certification must make the express deter-
mination that there was no just reason for delay).
179. 808 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1986).
180. Id. at 622. The benefit plan was terminated after Chromalloy acquired Glidden's previous
employer. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 623. The court reasoned that the district court had not made final decision because
it had failed to identify the parties to bc bound by the judgment. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. The court explained that "[ilf the judgment contains the finding, then the party must
appeal at once or not at all ... [and] [i]f the judgment does not contain the declaration, the party
must sit and wait." Id. at 623-24 (citations omitted).
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templated the prospect of an immediate appeal."18 It also explained that both
the parties and the appellate courts need objective criteria to determine
whether an order is appealable under Rule 54(b).1 87 Accordingly, the court
reasoned that the intent of the district judge was irrelevant." Therefore, the
court dismissed the appeal because the district court order did not contain a
proper certification.189
A few courts, however, reject this "mechanical" interpretation of Rule
54(b)'s certification requirement, and merely look for substantial compliance
with the requirements of Rule 54(b).' 90 In Alexander v. Chicago Park Dis-
trict, 9' the Seventh Circuit decided to accept a Rule 54(b) appeal despite the
district court's lack of technical compliance with the Rule."8 2 The court looked
to both the language of the district court order'93 and the trial court record'" .
to determine that the district court judge intended that the order be appeala-
ble under Rule 54(b). The court thus concluded that, despite its reservations
about deviating from the requirements of Rule 54(b), "less than technical
compliance will suffice when neither party is prejudiced by the lack of formal-
ity."' 95 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the order passed muster
under Rule 54(b) although it did not contain the "no just reason for delay"
language.
H. Fifth Circuit Cases-Proper Certification
Prior to the decision in Kelly v. Lee's Old Fashioned Hamburgers, the con-
186. Id. at 624; see also Foremost Sales Promotions v. Director, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms, 812 F.2d 1044, 1046 (7th Cir. 1987) (requiring the express findings contained in
Rule 54(b) for finality).
187. Foremost, 812 F.2d at 1046 ("The parties and the courts need objective and easily availa-
ble criteria to guide their decisions.").
188. Id.; accord Willhelm v. Eastern Airlines, 927 F.2d 971, 973 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Even if the
district court intended to enter a partial final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b), 'that intention is
irrelevant absent the express determination.'" (quoting Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cincinnati
TV 64 Ltd., 845 F.2d 674, 677 (7th Cir. 1988))).
189. Glidden, 808 F.2d at 628.
190. Alexander v. Chicago Park Dist., 773 F.2d 850 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1095 (1986); see Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 875 F.2d 1008, 1015 (7th Cir. 1989),
rev'd. on other grounds, 110 S. Ct. 2668 (1990) ("It is more judicially efficient for us to exercise
jurisdiction and reach the merits of the dispute now rather than cause a delay by demanding strict
technical compliance with the certification requirement."); Local P-171, Amalgamated Meat Cut-
ters & Butcher Workmen v. Thompson Farms Co., 642 F.2d 1065, 1072 (7th Cir. 1981) ("(W]e
think that no useful purpose would be served by insisting on [the Rule'sl language here.").
191. 773 F.2d 850 (7th Cir. 1985).
192. Id. at 855.
193. Id.
194. The court reasoned that because "the parties were explicitly told that the court wanted
guidance from an appellate decision, [it was] convinced that the parties knew of their right to
appeal." Id.
195. Id.; see also Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 642 F.2d at 1072 (not requiring technical com-
pliance with the Rule "[slince it (was] plain that neither party was prejudiced by the absence of
the talismanic wording of Rule 54(b)").
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flict within the Fifth Circuit regarding the proper language of a Rule 54(b)
certificate was even more pronounced.190 Some of the cases addressing this
issue rejected the mechanical approach to Rule 54(b) certification. 197 The first
major case that discussed this topic was EEOC v. Delta Airlines."8 In that
case, the district court dismissed some, but not all, portions of the EEOC's sex
discrimination complaint. 199 The district court's order stated that "the Court
expressly directs the entry of final judgment of the Court's order of June 30,
1977, dismissing count 7(c). '2 00 The court noted that the order did not liter-
ally track the requirements of Rule 54(b).2 0 1 The court nevertheless held that
the district court's wording provided sufficient evidence that the district court
intended to issue a Rule 54(b) order. 02 Accordingly, the court accepted the
appeal and decided the case on its merits.2 02
The next major Fifth Circuit case on this issue was Mills v. Zapata Drilling
Co.204 In that case, the wife of an employee who was killed in an offshore oil
drilling project sued Zapata, and several third-party actions and claims ulti-
mately followed. 20 5 The district court entered judgment in favor of the general
contractor against the subcontractor based on a previous indemnity agree-
ment.206 In determining whether the subcontractor's appeal was properly
before it, the appellate court first noted that the trial court had not entered
judgment on Mills' original complaint.2 07 It further recognized that the techni-
cal requirements of Rule 54(b) had not been met because the district court
had not made "an express determination that there was no just reason for
delay. ' 2 8 The court nevertheless accepted the appeal. It read the trial court
record as though the district court had dismissed one of the two remaining
claims.2 0 9 The court also stated that "[iut is not necessary for us to enforce a
196. Courts in the Fifth Circuit, however, unanimously agreed that a Rule 54(b) order was not
final absent proper certification. Borne v. A & P Boat Rentals No. 4, 755 F.2d 1131, 1133 (5th
Cir. 1985); see also Thompson v. Betts, 754 F.2d 1243, 1245 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that the
Rule 54(b) order was interlocutory absent proper certification).
197. Crowley Maritime Corp. v. Panama Canal Comm'n, 849 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1988); EEOC
v. Delta Airlines, 578 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1978).
198. 578 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1978).
199. Id. at 116. The district court dismissed those portions of the EEOC's complaint that chal-
lenged Delta's policy forbidding the employment of married women as flight attendants. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 116-17.
204. 722 F.2d 1170 (5th Cir. 1983).
205. Id. at 1171-73.
206. Id. at 1172-73.
207. Id. at 1173.
208. Id. The court also stated that "the technical requirements of the aforesaid rule have not
been met and, in strictness, [the court] would be warranted in concluding that as yet this is an
unappealable case." Id.
209. Id. The appellate court stated:
[W]e read the record as though the district court (1) had entered in the principal
action a judgment in the amount of $405,000 for the plaintiff Vicki Mills against
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mere technical, expensive, and burdensome compliance with a rule whose pur-
poses have already been accomplished. 2 1 ° The court thus concluded that the
case was properly appealable.
Another case that adopted this approach to Rule 54(b) certification was
Crowley Maritime Corp. v. Panama Canal Commission. 21 In Crowley, Rol-
stad, an employee of Crowley, was injured in a maritime accident.2 1 2 He filed
a motion to intervene in an action brought by Crowley.2'1 The magistrate
granted Rolstad's motion, but the district court dismissed his intervention on
statute of limitations grounds. 214 In doing so, the district court issued an order
that mentioned Rolstad's motion, which included the Rule 54(b) certification
language. 2 5 The order itself, however, did not contain the language.21e
The court of appeals accepted Rolstad's subsequent appeal. The court first
admitted that the district court did not expressly include Rule 54(b)'s "magi-
cal language" in any of its orders. 217 Nevertheless, the court declined to adopt
a "form-over-substance" approach to Rule 54(b)'s requirements. 2 8 It reasoned
that the district court's order called attention to Rolstad's motion containing
the requisite language. 21 9 Furthermore, the court held that the district judge's
intent to issue a Rule 54(b) order "cannot genuinely be disputed."22 There-
fore, the court concluded that it would "not enforce a 'technical, expensive,
and burdensome compliance' where to do so would not significantly advance
the purposes of Rule 54(b) and would only frustrate the manifest intent of the
Zapata, CNG, and Home Insurance Company and all other parties defendant or in-
tervening; and (2) had left unadjudicated the third party complaint of Zapata against
CNG; and (3) had dismissed with prejudice all other actions, third party actions,
claims, counterclaims, and other pleading of every kind.
Id.
210. Id.
211. 849 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1988).
212. Rolstad suffered leg injuries while on a barge during a mooring operation in the Panama
Canal. Id. at 952.
213. Id. Crowley brought its suit against the Panama Canal Commission after Congress
amended the Panama Canal Act in 1985. Crowley had previously settled with Rolstad and sought
reimbursement from the Commission. Id.
214. Id.
215. Rolstad's motion and proposed order stated in pertinent part:
[Pilaintiff requests that this Court amend the order dated May 12, 1987, pursuant to
Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to include the expression of opin-
ion that "the Court has made an express determination that there is no just reason for
delay and that it is adjudged that the plaintiff's complaint be and the same hereby is
dismissed."
Id. at 953.
216. Id. The district court's order merely stated, "Considering the motion, the memorandum,
the record and the law, IT IS ORDERED that the [second paragraph of the] motion be
GRANTED." Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
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parties and the trial court." '21
A split developed in the circuit when the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
decided In re Wood & Locker, Inc.222 In that case, the trustee for Wood &
Locker filed an action in bankruptcy court to avoid a preference of Interfirst
Bank-Dallas, Inc., one of Wood & Locker's creditors. 23 The United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Texas granted summary judg-
ment in favor of one of the creditors, Williams-Patterson.2 The trustee then
appealed to the district court . 2  The district court upheld the bankruptcy
court's decision, and the trustee then appealed the case to the court of
appeals. 2 8
The court of appeals first determined that it did not have jurisdiction over
the case under section 158(d) of the Bankruptcy Code.22 The court stated,
however, that it may have jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Bankruptcy
Rule 7054, which specifically incorporated Rule 54(b). 28 In analyzing the
case under Rule 54(b) principles, the court initially noted that the bankruptcy
court did not make an express determination that there was "no just reason
for delay. '229 The court then stated that "the aim . . . of Rule 54(b) [was] to
provide a bright-line rule for determining the appealability of orders by the
trial court" that finally adjudicate less than all claims or parties in an ac-
tion.280 It further stated that "we have generally required that Rule 54(b) be
strictly followed: If the trial court has not followed Rule 54(b) and expressly
certified a partial judgment as final, the appeal will be dismissed."123' Accord-
ingly, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction because the bank-
ruptcy court failed to certify its order.2 32
221. Id. (quoting Mills v. Zapata Drilling Co., 722 F.2d 1170, 1173-74 (5th Cir. 1983)).
222. 868 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1989).
223. The trustee sought to disallow a pre-petition claim filed by Williams-Patterson for
$1,090,000. Id. at 140-41. Eventually, William-Patterson's claim was transferred to Interfirst. Id.
224. Id. at 141.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 141-42.
227. Section 158(d) states in pertinent part: "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction over
appeals from all final decisions, judgments, orders, and decrees entered under subsections (a) and
(b) of this section." 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988). The court held that the bankruptcy court's partial
summary judgment was not a final decision under section 158(d). In re Wood & Locker, Inc., 868
F.2d at 142.
228. The court held that a non-final order may still be appealable if the nonfinality can be
"cured" under Rule 7054. In Re Wood Locker, Inc., 868 F.2d at 142.
229. Id. at 143.
230. Id. at 145. The court also stated that "[t]he certification process adopted in Rule 54(b)
was intended to avoid in ordinary civil cases the uncertainty that previously characterized the
appealability of partial judgments." Id.
231. Id. (citing Borne v. A & P Boat Rentals No. 4, 755 F.2d 1131, 1133 (5th Cir. 1985);
Matthews v. Ashland Chem., 703 F.2d 921 (5th Cir. 1983); Bouldeloche v. Tnemec, 693 F.2d
546, 547 (5th Cir. 1982); Cook v. Eizenman, 312 F.2d 134, 137 (5th Cir. 1963)). But see Mills v.
Zapata Drilling Co., 722 F.2d 1170, 1173 (5th Cir. 1983) (declining to require technical compli-
ance with Rule 54(b) where purposes of the rule are already accomplished).
232. In re Wood & Locker, Inc., 868 F.2d at 145. The court ultimately concluded:
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The Fifth Circuit endorsed this bright-line approach again in FSLIC v. Tul-
los-Pierremont." In that case, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Cor-
poration ("FSLIC") brought an action against Tullos-Pierremont and several
others based on a past due promissory note."3 ' It also sued James Gallagher on
his alleged promise to purchase the note. " The district court granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of Gallagher and against FSLIC on April 25, 1988.236
In October of 1988, FSLIC then moved to dismiss without prejudice its claims
against the remaining defendants because it was unable to serve them." , It
then appealed the summary judgment in favor of Gallagher.
Gallagher moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely because the summary
judgment had become final under Rule 54(b) in April.2" However, the court
decided that for purposes of appeal, the unserved defendants were not "par-
ties" to the action."'3 Therefore, the district court's grant of summary judg-
ment had become final in April under Section 1291 instead of under Rule
54(b).' 0 Accordingly, the court held that no Rule 54(b) certificate was neces-
sary to make the summary judgment appealable. " The court went on to note
in dictum, however, that "Rule 54(b) .. .suggest[s] and condone[s] a more
definite and express means of dealing with .. .appealable finality."'' The
court also stated that the Rule does so in order to " address an overriding
concern for certainty and for an express and unmistakable determination of
finality in ambiguous multi-party and multi-claim situations."'4 " The court
nevertheless concluded that, in the interest of clarity, it would be more effi-
cient to simply hold that unserved defendants are not parties for appeal pur-
poses. " Accordingly, the court dismissed FSLIC's appeal as untimely under
The same uncertainty that Rule 54(b) was designed to eliminate in the ordinary
civil context presently plagues the doctrine of appealability in contested matters in
bankruptcy. Rule 7054 helps to reduce that uncertainty in adversary proceedings by
providing a bright-line rule to determine the appealability of partial judgments. Al-
though the issue of finality ... will still arise when there is a dispute regarding the
propriety of Rule 54(b) certification ... Rule 7054 goes a long way toward simplify-
ing the issue of appealability in adversary proceedings. We see no reason to abandon
the clear benefits of the Rule.
Id. at 145-46.
233. 894 F.2d 1469 (5th Cir. 1990).
234. Id. at 1470.
235. Id.
236. The court felt that Gallagher had prima facie established, and the FSLIC had not ade-
quately controverted, that a condition to Gallagher's obligation to purchase the note had not been
fulfilled. Id.
237. Id. at 1470-71.
238. Id. at 1471.
239. Id. at 1471-74.
240. Id. at 1472.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 1475.
243. Id. The court also stated that the Rule provides "much needed certainty" in determining
when a final judgment has been entered. Id.
244. Id. at 1476. The court concluded that "the rule of Nagle-that unserved defendants are
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section 1291.
The Fifth Circuit was thus sharply divided over the issue of whether proper
certification requires a district court to include the phrase "no just reason for
delay" in its Rule 54(b) order.2 '5 Perhaps the court in Warfield v. Fidelity &
Deposit Co.24 best summarized the dilemma over proper certification when it
stated that the circuit's "precedent on what constitutes a Rule 54(b) certifica-
tion is in disarray. 12 7 The Fifth Circuit.Court of Appeals sat en banc in Kelly
v. Lee's Old Fashioned Hamburgers,48 to attempt to resolve the controversy
brewing over proper certification for Rule 54(b) orders.
II. KELLY v. LEE'S OLD FASHIONED HAMBURGERS
In Kelly v. Lee's Old Fashioned Hamburgers,'" the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals sat en banc to decide whether a district court must include the words
"no just reason for delay" in order to properly certify a Rule 54(b) order. The
court, by a ten-to-seven margin, rejected this form-over-substance approach.250
Instead, the court held that an order is final under Rule 54(b) as long as the
reviewing court can determine that the district court judge unmistakably in-
tended to issue such an order.251
A. Facts
In Kelly, 2' the plaintiff, Wendolyn Kelly, was injured when she was struck
by an automobile driven by Douglass Chetta, an employee of the defendant.2 53
Chetta was allegedly intoxicated at the time of the accident.25" Kelly sued
several parties, including Lee's insurer, State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.255
State Farm sought summary judgment based on the "liquor liability" exclu-
sion in its policy.256 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
State Farm, but it did not state in its order that there was "no just reason for
not parties for purposes of Rule 54(b) and that a judgment does not lack the finality necessary for
appeal merely because claims against such defendants remain undisposed of-[was] clearly pref-
erable to making a case-by-case determination of [their] status." Id. at 1475 (emphasis added).
245. See supra notes 196-244 and accompanying text (discussing Fifth Circuit cases establish-
ing the language required in a Rule 54(b) order).
246. 904 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1990).
247. Id. at 325 n.4.
248. 908 F.2d 1218 (7th Cir. 1990).
249. Id.
250. Id. at 1220.
251. Id.
252. 896 F.2d 923 (5th Cir.) (Kelly I), afid, 908 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1990)(en banc).
253. Id. at 923.
254. Id. Chetta, who was not on duty at the time of the accident, allegedly had been drinking
beer with fellow employees while the restaurant was being cleaned. Id.
255. Id.
256. The liquor liability provision excluded coverage for any liabilities the insured incurred "as
a person or organization engaged in the business of ... selling or serving alcoholic beverages." Id.
at 923 n.l.
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delay" of appeal.157 Instead, the district court captioned its order "Rule 54(b)
Judgment." ''5 The court also stated in the body of the order that it was enter-
ing "final judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)."25
Kelly appealed the district court's order.
B. Fifth Circuit Panel Opinion
A Fifth Circuit panel affirmed the trial court by a two-to-one margin 8
The court initially held that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Rule
54(b) although the district court's order did not expressly contain the phrase
"no just reason for delay."'2" The majority relied on the reasoning in Crowley
Maritime Corp. v. Panama Canal Commission 62 and EEOC v. Delta Air-
lines2 68 to decide that the Fifth Circuit does not require strict compliance with
the express language requirement of Rule 54(b).264 The rule that the majority
extracted from these cases was that the district court did not need to include
any particular language in its Rule 54(b) order so long as the order reflected
its "unmistakable intent" to enter an appealable order under Rule 54(b) 5
Accordingly, the majority concluded that the district court's order, entitled
"Rule 54(b) Judgment," reflected the district court judge's unmistakable in-
tent to issue a Rule 54(b) partial judgment. 266 The panel majority then upheld
the district court's grant of summary judgment on the merits. 67
Judge Williams dissented in part and concurred in part with the majority
decision.26 8 He argued that the court did not have jurisdiction to hear the ap-
peal because the district court's order did not satisfy the certification require-
257. Id. at 923-24.
258. Id. at 924.
259. Id.
260. Kelly 1, 896 F.2d at 923. Judge Davis wrote the majority opinion, and it was joined by
Judge Garza. Id. Judge Williams dissented in part and concurred in part. Id. at 925 (Williams, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
261. Id. at 924.
262. 849 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1988); see supra notes 208-18 and accompanying text (discussing
Crowley).
263. 578 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1978); see supra notes 198-203 and accompanying text (discussing
Delta Airlines).
264. Kelly 1, 896 F.2d at 924. The court stated that the Fifth Circuit had "refused to take a
'form-over-substance' approach to Rule 54(b), but rather recognized 'the manifest intent of the
parties and the trial court' that a final judgment would be entered." Id. (quoting Crowley, 849
F.2d at 953.).
265. Id. The court added that "although we encourage the district courts to follow the rule and
make the 'express determinations' . . . we do not now require it." Id.
266. Id.
267. The court unanimously upheld the district court's grant of summary judgment based on
the liquor liability exclusion in Lee's insurance policy. Judge Davis found that, under Louisiana
law, liquor liability clauses have consistently been found to be unambiguous and thus are enforced
as written. Id. at 924-25.
268. Id. at 925-27 (Williams, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Judge Williams
dissented on the Rule 54(b) certification issue and concurred with the majority on the merits. Id.
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ment of Rule 54(b)."6 Judge Williams felt that the Rule's certification re-
quirement should be interpreted strictly. 70 He stated that federal courts
consistently demand trial courts to state sufficiently and expressly that "no just
reason for delay" exists.27 1 Judge Williams reasoned that strict enforcement of
the certification requirement was necessary to insure that Rule 54(b) is ap-
plied only in proper cases.)2 Accordingly, Judge Williams dissented on the
issue of the appellate court's jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 73 A rehearing,
before the en banc Fifth Circuit, was granted on April 23, 1990.274
C. The En Banc Decision
1. The Majority Opinion
The en banc majority, by a ten-to-seven margin, affirmed the panel's deci-
sion per curiam.2 5 The court first recognized that in prior Fifth Circuit deci-
sions, "where neither the order appealed from nor the related portions of the
record reflect an intent by the district judge to enter a partial final judgment,
we refused to consider the order appealable as a final judgment. '276 Addition-
ally, the majority found Fifth Circuit precedent consistent in that where the
language of the order or the related record did evidence such an intent, courts
have considered the order appealable.2 77 The court thus adopted the following
rule: where the language of an order appealed from, either independently or
together with the related portions of the record referred to in the order, re-
269. Id. at 926.
270. Id. at 925. Judge Williams argued that Fifth Circuit precedent was inconclusive on this
issue. Id.
271. Judge Williams stated that "the overwhelming majority of case authority is that Rule
54(b) means what it says." Id. at 926 (emphasizing the holding in Frank Briscoe Co v. Morrison-
Knudsen Co., 776 F.2d 1414, 1415 (9th Cir. 1985)).
272. Id. Judge Williams also stated:
All the Rule undertakes to do is to require that the court focus specifically upon the
requisite findings. This in turn means that the court can have the issue briefed if there
is any real question with respect to it and can give it the full consideration it deserves.
This is little enough to ask in enforcing a rule which constitutes an exception to an
extremely basic and important policy against piecemeal appeals. If we do not remand
when the requisite findings are not made, there simply is no enforcement of the rule.
Then a rule which was designed with great care and with express requirements be-
comes a rule of boilerplate. That is not and cannot be what is intended by the rule.
Id. at 927.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. 908 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc). Circuit Judges Davis, Duhe, Garwood, Garza,
Higginbotham, Jones, King, Politz, Reavley and Wiener joined in the majority per curiam
opinion.
276. Id. at 1219-20 (citing Borne v. A & P Boat Rentals No. 4, 755 F.2d 1131 (5th Cir. 1985),
and Thompson v. Betts, 754 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1985)).
277. Id. at 1220. The en bane majority, like the panel majority, relied on Crowley and Delta
Airlines for this proposition. See supra note 264 and accompanying text (noting that the reason-
ing in Crowley and Delta Airlines supports the proposition that the Fifth Circuit does not require
strict compliance with the express language requirement of Rule 54(b)).
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flects the district court's "unmistakable intent" to enter a partial final judg-
ment under Rule 54(b), the order is appealable even if it omits the words "no
just reason for delay. '7 S
The majority first argued that its holding was consistent with Rule 54(b)'s
requirement that the district judge make an "express determination that nojust reason for delay" exists. 79 It reasoned that where the district court recites
the words "Rule 54(b)" in its order, the court expressly incorporates the entire
Rule in its order.280 The court further reasoned that where the district court
incorporates the Rule by reference, "it signals that the requirements of the
Rule have been met and entry of partial final judgment is proper." 281 The
majority also asserted that this "incorporation" theory was a common-sense
interpretation of Rule 54(b).2 12 It reasoned that its liberal approach to Rule
54(b) was consistent with the command in Rule 1 that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure be construed "to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive deter-
mination of every action. ' 283 Finally, the majority contended that its "unmis-
takable intent" standard was in accord with the purpose of Rule 54(b)'s "ex-
press determination" requirement.28  The majority reasoned that this liberal
interpretation of Rule 54(b) furthers the purpose of the requirement because
such an interpretation, to its knowledge, never caused litigants problems in the
past. 285
After supporting its new standard, the majority overruled Mills v.
Zapata.28 The majority held that the court in Mills "apparently inferred the
278. Kelly, 908 F.2d at 1220. Obviously, the majority's new standard does not require the
district court to include a statement of reasons in its order either.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 1220-21.
282. Id. at 1221.
283. Id. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure I states:
These rules govern the procedure in the United States district courts in all suits of a
civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity or in admiralty, with all
the exceptions stated in Rule 81. They shall be construed to secure the just, speedy
inexpensive determination of every action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (emphasis added). Generally, Rule I requires courts to construe the Rules
liberally to further the course of justice. 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 19 § 1029, at 110-11
(2d ed., 1987); see also McDougall v. Dunn, 468 F.2d 468, 471 (4th Cir. 1972) ("[R]ules of
federal practice or procedure are designed to promote ends of justice, not defeat them."); Hartley
& Parker, Inc. v. Florida Beverage Co., 348 F.2d 161, 163 (5th Cir. 1965) ("[T]he spirit of
federal practice [is] to accord substantial justice over mere technical contentions.").
284. Kelly, 908 F.2d at 1221.
285. Id.
The court accordingly stated:
Counsel should know that the district court has entered a partial final judgment when
the order alone or the order together with the motion or some other portion of the
record referred to in the order contains clear language reflecting the court's intent to
enter the judgment under Rule 54(b).
Id.
286. Mills v. Zapata Drilling Co., 722 F.2d 1170 (5th Cir. 1983).
[Vol. 41:257
CERTAINTY UNDER RULE 54(B)
district court's intent to enter a final judgment from the posture of the case
and the circumstances surrounding the entry of judgment. 2 87 Thus, the ma-
jority noted that the decision was inconsistent with its "unmistakable intent"
approach and was therefore overruled. 88
Finally, the majority applied the "unmistakable intent" standard to the
facts of Kelly.2 ' Under this standard, the majority stated that the only issue
was whether the district court's language reflected with unmistakable clarity
an intent to enter a partial final judgment under Rule 54(b).2 90 The majority
held that since the district court order in Kelly was captioned "F.R.C.P.
54(b)" and further directed "that there be a final judgment entered pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)," it was unmistakably clear that the
trial judge intended to issue a partial final judgment under Rule 54(b). 291 The
majority ruled that it was reasonable to assume that federal district court
judges know the requirements of such a frequently used Rule.29 Therefore,
where a district court directs that a 54(b) judgment be prepared and then
enters judgment pursuant to the Rule, it could only mean that the require-
ments of the Rule were met.298 Accordingly, the majority affirmed the panel's
decision.
2. The Dissent
The dissent, written by Judge Smith,2 94 attacked the majority opinion on
several grounds. In general, the dissent argued that the majority misinter-
preted the clear and unambiguous language of Rule 54(b). Judge Smith also
asserted that the majority's "unmistakable intent" standard was contrary to
the purpose of the certification requirement. Finally, Judge Smith argued that
this case-by-case approach would lead to greater confusion for litigants and
reviewing courts attempting to determine the appealability of a district court
partial final judgment.
The dissent first argued that the majority's interpretation of Rule 54(b) ig-
nored the word "express" in the Rule's command that a district court make an
"express determination that no just reason for delay" exists. 95 Judge Smith
contended that the majority's interpretation of the Rule effectively changed
the word "express" in the Rule to "implied." ' The dissent further argued
287. Kelly, 908 F.2d at 1221. For a more detailed discussion of the court's holding in Mills, see
supra notes 204-10 and accompanying text.
288. Kelly, 908 F.2d at 1221.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 1221-22.
294. Judge Smith's dissent was joined by Circuit Judges Barksdale, Gee, Johnson, Jolly, Wil-
liams, and Chief Judge Clark. Id. at 1222 (Smith, J., dissenting).
295. Id.
296. Id. ("The majority ... reads the rule either as though the word 'express' did not appear,
or (similarly) as though 'express' meant the same thing as 'implied.' "). Judge Smith also cited a
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that the drafters of the amended Rule 54(b) included the word "express" in
the Rule for a specific reason: to insure that litigants know with certainty
when to appeal a partial final judgment.297 Judge Smith asserted that after the
majority holding, "the same uncertainty that attended the pre-1946 rule will
appertain now."298 The dissent thus concluded that the majority, by ignoring
the obvious meaning of the word "express," read the 1946 Amendment out of
the Rule. 9
The dissent next argued that the majority opinion was inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's direction in Harris v. Reed.300 Judge Smith believed that the
Court in Harris dealt with an issue similar to the one at bar: whether a re-
viewing court should require that requisite findings be set forth expressly."'
The dissent then quoted Harris, stating that the "plain statement rule relieves
a federal court from having to determine whether in a given case ... the state
court has chosen to forgive a procedural default."302 Judge Smith reasoned
that by analogy, the same rationale should apply in a Rule 54(b) context: if
the order appealed from does not indicate anywhere that the trial court consid-
ered whether the requirements of the Rule have been met, an appellate court
need not attempt to do so through conjecture, supposition, and surmise.303 The
dissent thus concluded that the majority's "unmistakable intent" approach will
require an appellate court to engage in this type of speculation, precluded by
Harris, to determine whether the trial court made the required findings under
Rule 54(b)."04
host of cases that illustrate the obvious difference between an express and implied term. Id. at
1224 n.3.
297. Id. at 1223. The dissent briefly examined the history of Rule 54(b) and the problems that
litigants and courts encountered with the original Rule 54(b). Id.
298. Id. The dissent further stated that "[w]ithout such a[n] [express] statement, the prospec-
tive appellant is left in the same Never-Never-Land as before, wondering whether to take a pro-
spective appeal or risk losing the right to appeal after judgment on the remaining claims." Id.
(emphasis added).
299. Id.
300. Id. at 1224. In Harris, defendant Harris, who had been convicted of murder in an Illinois
state court, brought a petition of writ of habeas corpus on the grounds of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 257-58 (1989). The Supreme Court, per Justice Blackmun,
held that the "plain statement rule" of Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1042 (1983), applied to
appeals raised on federal habeas corpus grounds as well as ones on direct review. Harris, 489 U.S.
at 257. The Long rule permits the court to reach a federal question on review unless the state
court's opinion contains "a plain statement" that its decision rests on adequate state grounds. Id.
at 260-65. Accordingly, Justice Blackmun held that the Illinois Appellate Court's statement that
Harris' ineffective counsel claim "could have been raised [on] direct appeal" did not satisfy the
plain statement rule. Id. at 266. Thus, Justice Blackmun concluded that federal review was not
precluded. Id.
301. Kelly, 908 F.2d at 1225 (Smith, J., dissenting).
302. Id. (quoting Harris, 489 U.S. at 264 n. 11.).
303. Id.
304. Id. ("[Flor all we know, the district court may have overlooked (or chosen to forgive) the
[certification] requirement."). Judge Smith also argued that, since the Supreme Court in Harris
held that the Illinois Appellate Court's statement that Harris' allegations "could have been raised
[on] direct appeal" was insufficient as an "explicit" reliance on state grounds, Harris stands for
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The dissent also attacked the majority's reasoning because it ignored the
"however designated" clause in Rule 54(b).305 This clause states: "In the ab-
sence of such express determination and direction, 306 any order or other form
of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all claims or the
rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action
as to any of the claims or parties. 3 0 7 Judge Smith argued that this provision
serves to underscore the importance of the express determination requirement
by preventing a district court from circumventing the Rule through the use of
a title.30 8 Accordingly, the dissent concluded that the "however designated"
clause in Rule 54(b) precluded the majority's argument that an order that is
captioned "Rule 54(b)" incorporates the entire Rule.309
The dissent next argued that the majority's construction of Rule 54(b) vio-
lated the "plain meaning rule."181 0 Relying on recent Supreme Court opin-
ions,3 ' Judge Smith believed that courts are required to interpret the Federal
Rules strictly where the terms are unambiguous, even if the result is some-
times harsh.312 Similarly, the dissent also noted that the Supreme Court had
previously rejected Fifth Circuit attempts to depart from the precise words of
a statute in the interest of "policy considerations. '"3 13 The dissent concluded by
arguing that the majority's "unmistakable intent" standard was nothing more
than an attempt to engage in prohibited judicial legislation."1 4
The dissent also scolded the majority for its cursory inspection of Fifth Cir-
cuit precedent.3 15 Judge Smith specifically took issue with the majority's asser-
tion that "[w]ith one exception, our Rule 54(b) cases follow a consistent
the proposition that the term "expressly" should be interpreted strictly. Id.
305. Id. at 1226.
306. The express determination that "no just reason for delay" exists and the express direction
that "final judgment be entered." FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
307. Id. (emphasis added).
308. Kelly, 908 F.2d at 1226 (Smith, J., dissenting) ("In other words, the name [of an order]
makes no difference: Whatever the document is entitled or 'designated,' it nevertheless must con-
tain the requisite express determination.").
309. Id. Judge Smith simply argued that under the Rule's plain language, any order, however
designated, is not final under Rule 54(b) absent the certification language. Id.
310. Id.
311. See Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 125 (1989) (noting
that once the Supreme Court ascertains the plain meaning of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, its judicial inquiry is complete); Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 318 (1988)
(insisting upon adherence to a Rule's strict meaning even where the result would be harsh). But
see supra note 283 (noting that Rule 1 requires that courts interpret the Rules liberally).
312. Kelly, 908 F.2d at 1227 (Smith, J., dissenting).
313. Id. Judge Smith referred to Northbrook Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Brewer, 493 U.S. 6 (1989),
which overruled Campbell v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 552 F.2d 604 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding
that an insurer attempting to invoke federal diversity jurisdiction does not preclude application of
a state statute under which an insurer is deemed a citizen of the insured's state).
314. Kelly, 908 F.2d at 1227 (Kelly, J., dissenting) ("Here, in adopting what it modestly terms
as a 'practical, common sense interpretation of Rule 54(b),' . . . the en banc court has resorted to
the same policy-consideration approach that was rejected in Northbrook.").
315. Id. at 1228.
1991]
DEPA UL LAW REVIEW
path." 6 He noted that several Fifth Circuit opinions had stated that the
Rule's certification requirement should be strictly construed." 7 The dissent
also criticized the majority for overruling Mills. 18 Judge Smith questioned the
majority's decision to base its holding on Crowley and yet overrule Mills,
when Crowley explicitly relied on Mills in adopting its substance-over-form
approach. 9 The dissent thus concluded that the majority, which had set out
to clarify the issue of Rule 54(b) certification, actually made the topic more
confusing for litigants. 2 0
Finally, the dissent criticized the majority's new case-by-case approach to
finality under Rule 54(b).821 Judge Smith argued that a "bright-line" test re-
quiring strict compliance with the certification requirement is a better ap-
proach for three reasons. First, it clearly warns litigants when the time for
appeal begins to run.322 Second, a bright-line rule avoids duplicative and un-
necessary appeals.3 23 Finally, such a rule is easier to administer and provides
greater objectivity. 24 Accordingly, Judge Smith stated that it was not too on-
erous to require a district court to expressly state that it has decided there is
"no just reason for delay. 3 23 Judge Smith concluded his dissent by arguing
that the majority's new case-by-case approach will only add to the confusion
surrounding Rule 54(b)'s certification requirement.32 6
With the decision in Kelly, Rule 54(b) certification requirements retreated
from a formalistic approach dictating strict adherence to the technical word-
ing of Rule 54(b). Instead, the Fifth Circuit majority found a case-by-case,
interpretive approach the more reasonable alternative. In the following section
of this Note, the contrast between these two approaches is examined, focusing
on a thorough analysis of the en banc decision in Kelly.
IV. ANALYSIS
The Kelly decision is subject to both a broad and a narrow interpretation. If
interpreted narrowly, the opinion stands for the proposition that where a dis-
316. Id.
317. Id. (citing In re Wood & Locker, Inc., 868 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1989), and Thompson v.
Betts, 754 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1985)). The dissent also noted that the majority decision "puts
[the circuit] out of step with other circuits," id. at 1227, which impose a more exacting require-
ment, such as a statement of reasons. Id. at 1228. For a detailed discussion of the statement-of-
reasons debate, see supra notes 163-73 and accompanying text.
318. Kelly, 908 F.2d at 1228 (Smith, J., dissenting).
319. Id.
320. Id. ("(Tihe court leaves it to the hapless litigant to determine whether this circuit hence-
forth recognizes the strict interpretation of Wood & Locker and Thompson or the relaxed stan-
dard of Crowley ...[and] therefore, our Rule 54(b) law in this circuit remains in disarray.").
321. Id.
322. Id. at 1227.
323. Id.
324. Id. For support of the advantages of bright-line jurisdictional rules, see supra notes 56-61,
185-89 and accompanying text.
325. Kelly, 908 F.2d at 1228 (Smith, J., dissenting).
326. Id. at 1229 ("[T]he en banc majority has only muddied the water.").
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trict court judge entitles an order "Rule 54(b)" and further directs that "there
be final judgment entered pursuant to F.R.C.P. 54(b)," the order is properly
certified under the Rule."' If interpreted broadly, the decision stands for the
proposition that where any language, either in the order itself or together with
the related record, reflects the district court judge's intent to enter a partial
final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b), the order is properly certified.823 This
Note contends that the majority's legal reasoning supporting either interpreta-
tion is flawed.
A. Narrow Interpretation
The narrow interpretation of Kelly commands that where a district court
entitles its order "Rule 54(b)" and orders judgment entered pursuant to the
Rule, the order incorporates the entire Rule, including an express determina-
tion that there is "no just reason for delay."32 The majority's basic rationale
for this position is that where the title of the order mentions Rule 54(b) and
the district court enters judgment pursuant to the Rule, the order provides the
same "trigger" of appealability as if the phrase "no just reason for delay"
were included in the order.330 Accordingly, the majority adopted a substance-
over-form approach to the certification requirement and declined to require
formal compliance with the Rule when its substance is accomplished.3"
The majority's reasoning in support of this "incorporation theory" is suspect
for several reasons. First, this approach discourages district couris from prop-
erly asserting their role in the Rule 54(b) procedural framework. Second, this
327. Id. at 1220 ("When the court recites Rule 54(b) in the order or grants a motion request-
ing entry of judgment under Rule 54(b), the court expressly incorporates the entire Rule by refer-
ence and signals its conclusion that the requirements of the Rule have been met.").
328. Id. ("Where, on the other hand, the language in the order [appealed from], either inde-
pendently or together with related parts of the record [referred to in the order] reflects the trial
judge's clear intent to enter a partial final judgment under Rule 54(b), [we consider] the order
appealable.").
A recent district court decision in the Fifth Circuit offers no guidance on which interpretation
of Kelly will eventually be adopted. See Courville v. Texaco, 1991 WL 55794 (E.D. La. Apr. 9,
1991). In Courville, the court stated:
Texaco and INA urge this Court to amend the February 21, 1991 Judgment and
include the phrase "no just reason for delay." The Fifth Circuit has stated that such a
statement is unnecessary. "If the language in the order appealed from, either indepen-
dently or together with related portions of the record referred to in the order, reflects
the district court's unmistakable intent to enter a partial final judgment under Rule
54(b), nothing else is required to make the order appealable." [quoting Kelly. 908
F.2d at 1220]. When this Court "directed that a 54(b) Judgment be prepared, then
entered judgment 'pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)' it could have
meant one thing only. The requirements of the Rule were satisfied ....
Id. at *2 (quoting Kelly, 908 F.2d at 1224).
329. See supra note 327 and accompanying text (noting the narrow interpretation of the Kelly
decision).
330. Kelly, 908 F.2d at 1221-22.
331. Id. at 1220 ("We do not require the judge to mechanically recite the words 'no just reason
for delay.' ") (emphasis added).
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new rule contradicts the plain language of Rule 54(b). Finally, the "incorpora-
tion rule" fails to recognize that bright-line rules are preferable to case-by-
case determinations when deciding jurisdictional issues.
The first problem with the majority's incorporation rule is that it severely
distorts the procedural framework of Rule 54(b). That framework was estab-
lished by the Supreme Court in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey33 and in
Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co." In those cases, the Court held
that the district court's role in the Rule 54(b) process is to act as a "dis-
patcher."'" More specifically, the district court must first determine that a
judgment regarding a separate party or claim is final under section 1291.-15
The district court must then decide whether that final judgment is sufficiently
separate from the rest of the case so that there is "no just reason for delay" of
appeal. 36 Finally, the Court emphasized that the trial court's decision must be
carefully reviewed by the courts of appeals on an abuse of discretion
standard.33 7
The Kelly majority's incorporation rule distorts the district court's role in
this framework because it discourages district court judges from carefully con-
sidering the factors relevant to determining that there is "no just reason for
delay." If a district court may properly certify an order under Rule 54(b) by
simply entitling it "Rule 54(b)," then the court certainly has little reason to
meticulously examine the factors relevant to the determination that there is
"no just reason for delay."' 38 This defeats the very reason why the Supreme
Court granted the district court such broad discretion in making the
determination. 3'9
332. 351 U.S. 427 (1956).
333. 446 U.S. 1 (1979). For a more detailed discussion of the holdings in Sears and Curtiss-
Wright, see supra notes 122-62 and accompanying text.
334. Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 8; Sears, 351 U.S. at 435-38; see also Pahlavi v. Paladjian,
744 F.2d 902, 904 (1st Cir. 1984) (mentioning district court's role as a "dispatcher").
335. Sears, 351 U.S. at 436.
336. Id.; Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 8.
337. Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 10 ("The court of appeals must, of course, scrutinize the
district court's evaluation of such factors as the interrelationship of the claims so as to prevent
piecemeal appeals in cases which should be reviewed only as single units.").
338. See Hayden v. MacDonald, 719 F.2d 266, 269 (1983) (arguing that where a district court
is required to include both the language of the Rule and the reasons behind it, the court is more
likely to find that immediate appeal is unwarranted). This is not to say that when a judge is
required to include in his order the language "no just reason for delay," he will automatically
consider the factors relevant to such a determination. However, there certainly is a much better
chance that he will consider those factors if he is required to state those five words in the order.
339. The Court in Curtiss-Wright emphasized that the reason district courts are given such
broad discretion is because of their unique ability to determine whether "no just reason for delay"
of appeal exists. Curtiss-Wright, 446 U.S. at 10 ("[T]he discretionary judgment of the district
court should be given substantial deference, for that court is 'the one most likely to be familiar
with the case and with any justifiable reason for delay.'" (quoting Sears, 351 U.S. at 437)); see
also 10 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 19, at § 2659, at 97 (2d ed., 1983) ("Because of the trial
court's familiarity with the case, this decision [to certify a Rule 54(b) appeal] rests in the discre-
tion of the [trial] judge.").
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The majority responded to this argument by stating that it is reasonable to
presume that district court judges know the requirements of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.340 Accordingly, it refused to adopt a form-over-substance
approach to the Rule 54(b) certification requirement. 341 This argument, how-
ever, ignores the fact that "form is substance" with respect to jurisdictional
rules.342 The drafters of Rule 54(b) selected the five words "no just reason for
delay" as the "trigger" for appealability for a specific reason: so that district
court judges will meticulously consider the reasons why there is "no just rea-
son for delay" of appeal in each particular case.34 3 Subsequent federal courts
have thus held that if the certification requirement is interpreted as written, it
insures that Rule 54(b) orders will be issued only in warranted cases.3 4
The majority's incorporation rule, conversely, selects its own new triggers:
an order entitled "Rule 54(b)," or an order that enters judgment pursuant to
Rule 54(b). Clearly, these triggers have nothing to do with the requirement
that district courts carefully weigh the competing factors relevant to a deter-
mination that there is "no just reason for delay." 4 5 Therefore, the majority's
340. Kelly v. Lee's Old Fashioned Hamburgers, 908 F.2d 1218, 1221 (5th Cir. 1990) (en
banc).
341. Id. at 1220.
342. See Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394, 406 (1957). In Carroll, the Court responded
to the government's argument that it should not exalt form over substance by stating:
[Florm is substance with respect to ascertaining the existence of appellate jurisdic-
tion. While it is always necessary to categorize a situation realistically, to place a
given order according to its real effect, it remains true that the categories themselves
were defined by the Congress in terms of form. Many interlocutory decisions of a trial
court may be of grave importance to a litigant, yet are not amenable to appeal at the
time entered ....
Id.; see also 15 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 19, § 3913, at 523 (1st ed., 1976) ("Formality..
is not always sterile.").
343. While the certification requirement clearly was intended to increase certainty, see supra
notes 114-17 and accompanying text, the drafters could have chosen any phrase to signal appeala-
bility. For instance, the Rule could have required the order to state that it was an "appealable
partial final judgment." Instead, however, the drafters presumably chose the phrase "no just rea-
son for delay" to induce courts to in fact carefully consider whether there is any reason for delay-
ing immediate appeal. See Local P-171, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Thompson Farms Co., 642
F.2d 1065, 1071-72 (7th Cir. 1981) ("The discretionary component of Rule 54(b), which requires
the district court to make an 'express determination that there is no just reason for delay,' serves
[to] . . . limit its power to grant certification by requiring it to weigh the virtues of accelerated
judgment against the possible drawbacks of piecemeal review.") (emphasis added).
344. See. e.g., Panichella v. Pennsylvania R.R., 252 F.2d 452, 455 (3d Cir. 1958). In
Panichella, the court stated:
[A]n application for a 54(b) order requires the trial judge to exercise considered dis-
cretion, weighing the overall policy against piecemeal appeals against whatever exi-
gencies the case at hand may present ... [and] the draftsmen of this Rule have made
explicit their thought that it would serve only to authorize "the exercise of a discre-
tionary power to afford a remedy in the infrequent harsh case."
Id. (quoting FED R. Civ. P. 54(b) advisory committee's note).
345. In fact, the Rule on its face requires the district court to make an express direction for the
entry of final judgement as a separate requirement from the express determination that there is
"no just reason for delay." FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Furthermore, the title of an order cannot be
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incorporation rule condones, if not promotes, judicial laziness and inefficiency.
The final problem with the majority's incorporation rule is that it com-
pletely contradicts Rule 54(b)'s plain language. Rule 54(b)'s certification re-
quirement commands that a district court may issue a partial final judgment
under the Rule only if it includes an "express determination that there is no
just reason for delay" of appeal and an "express determination that judgment
be entered."" The rule also states that any other form of judgment, however
designated, does not terminate the rights of the parties. " ' An order that is
entitled "Rule 54(b)," or that contains a direction for judgment pursuant to
the Rule, clearly is not a final order under a literal reading of the Rule.
Nevertheless, the majority reasoned that its diversion from the literal lan-
guage of the Rule was required by the command in Rule 1 that the Federal
Rules be "construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination
of every action on the merits." 48 While Rule 1 allows a court to interpret the
Federal Rules liberally, it does not permit a court to rewrite them in favor of
its view of practicality.340 In fact, the Supreme Court has recently held that
statutory construction is inappropriate where language of a rule is unambigu-
ous.'5 ° Accordingly, the majority's reliance on Rule 1 to "blue-pencil" Rule
54(b) is nothing more than prohibited judicial legislation.351
B. Broad Interpretation
The majority opinion in Kelly can be interpreted as detailed above. The
opinion, however, most likely stands for the broad proposition that a Rule
54(b) order is properly certified so long as the reviewing court can determine,
from either the language of the order itself or from the related record, that the
district court had an "unmistakable intent" to issue a Rule 54(b) order.35 2 The
majority's legal analysis in support of this broader standard is even less per-
suasive.3 53 First, this new standard transforms the Rule's requirement of an
seriously argued to be related to the deliberate consideration of the factors relevant to a determi-
nation that there is no just reason for delay.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Kelly v. Lee's Old Fashioned Hamburgers, 908 F.2d 1218, 1221 (5th Cir. 1990) (en
banc); see supra note 283 (discussing Rule I and authorities arguing that the Federal Rules
should be construed liberally).
349. See Schlangenhauf v. Holder, Inc., 379 U.S. 104, 121 (1964) ("The Rules should be liber-
ally construed, but they should not be expanded by disregarding plainly expressed limitations.").
350. See, e.g., Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 125 (1989)
("When we find the terms ... [of a Federal Rule] unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete."
(citing Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981)).
351. Kelly, 908 F.2d 1227 (Smith, J., dissenting).
352. Id. at 1220. Since this is the standard that the majority applied to the facts in Kelly, it is
reasonable to assume that the court intended coirts to apply the "unmistakable intent" standard
in future Rule 54(b) jurisprudence.
353. Clearly, however, the same criticisms of the narrow interpretation of the majority opinion
in Kelly, see supra notes 329-51 and accompanying text, also apply to the more broad understand-
ing of the decision.
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"express" determination that there is "no just reason for delay" into a require-
ment of a mere "implied" determination. Second, the "unmistakable intent"
standard's case-by-case approach to finality completely eradicates the purpose
and effectiveness of the certification requirement.
The first flaw in the majority's rationale for the "unmistakable intent" stan-
dard is that it is inconsistent with the language of Rule 54(b).3 5" Under this
new standard, the district court need not include any precise language in its
Rule 54(b) order."5 Instead, the only issue is whether the order, read indepen-
dently or together with the related record, unmistakably reflects the district
court judge's intent to issue a partial final judgment under Rule 54(b)." The
majority justified this new approach by reasoning that such a rule was a
"practical, common sense" interpretation of Rule 54(b)'s certification require-
ment and is consistent with its purpose. 35 7
The problem with this analysis, however, is that it ignores the language of
Rule 54(b). The Rule states that in order to issue a partial final judgment
under Rule 54(b), the district court judge must make an "express determina-
tion that there is no just reason for delay." ' Notwithstanding this language,
under the unmistakable intent standard a district court is only required to
somehow inject its "unmistakable intent"359 to issue a Rule 54(b) final judg-
ment somewhere in the order or in the "related record." 6 ' In essence, the
majority has simply rewritten the Rule, replacing the word "express" with the
word "implied."'" This form of statutory construction is not only prohib-
354. See supra note Ill (stating the text of Rule 54(b)).
355. Kelly. 908 F.2d at 1220 ("If the language in the order appealed from, either indepen-
dently or together with the related portions of the record referred to in the order, reflects the
district court's unmistakable intent to enter a partial final judgment, nothing else is required to
make the order appealable.") (emphasis added).
356. Id.
357. Id. at 1221.
358. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (emphasis added).
359. It is irrelevant that the majority continually qualifies its standard by stating that the dis-
trict court's intent must be "unmistakable." This is true because the majority offers no guidelines
as to when a district court's intent is "mistakable." It merely states that in the case at bar where
the order was entitled "Rule 54(b)," the court's intent was unmistakable. Kelly, 908 F.2d at 1220.
However, this offers no guidance for future courts and litigants who try to determine whether a
district court's intent is "unmistakable." Furthermore, the majority does not list any factors that
future interested parties could rely on to determine the "mistakeness" of the district court's intent.
Accordingly, the majority has established a "case-by-case" approach to Rule 54(b) appealability
in the true sense of the term.
360. The fact that the majority requires the district court's unmistakable intent in the "related
record" is also meaningless. The majority never attempts to define which portions of the record
are related to a Rule 54(b) order. Presumably, any part of the record that evidences the district
court's intent to issue a partial final judgment would be related to the Rule 54(b) order.
361. Judge Smith persuasively argued in his dissent that the majority analysis involves implica-
tion, not expression. Kelly, 908 F.2d at 1222 (Smith, J., dissenting). He also pointed out that if
the majority's definition were applied to other substantive areas of the law, total chaos would
result. Id. at 1223.
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ited a 2 it is also impractical36 3 and senseless.38 4
While the majority's "unmistakable intent" approach clearly contradicts the
precise language of rule requiring an "express" determination, it also frus-
trates the very purpose of the certification requirement. The majority stated
that the purpose of the express determination requirement was to give litigants
a clear statement of what the court intended with reference to the finality of a
partial judgment. " The majority then concluded that its "unmistakable in-
tent" standard was compatible with that purpose because it had never caused
litigants problems in the past.66
Although the majority correctly identified the purpose of the certification
requirement, its interpretation of the Rule is not compatible with it. The "un-
mistakable intent" standard essentially requires the appellate court to inter-
pret the district court judge's intent regarding the appealability of its order
under Rule 54(b) on a case-by-case basis.867 In emphasizing the need for clar-
ity in jurisdictional rules, modern federal courts have consistently rejected this
type of case-by-case approach to finality.36 The majority has thus replaced an
easy-to-apply, bright-line test that simply required interested parties to look
for one specific phrase in one specific place.366 In its place, the majority estab-
lished an ambiguous case-by-case approach requiring litigants and reviewing
courts to look virtually everywhere in the record for presumably anything that
could indicate the district court judge's intent to issue a partial final judgment
under Rule 54(b).3 70 Therefore, the "unmistakable intent" approach clearly is
not compatible with the purpose of the certification requirement: to provide
362. See supra notes 112-19 (asserting that federal rules should not be interpreted to disregard
their plain language).
363. See infra notes 379-89 and accompanying text.
364. See infra notes 379-89 and accompanying text.
365. See infra notes 326-83 and accompanying text. The majority quoted the often-cited pas-
sage from Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 512 (1950), stating that the
obvious purpose of the Rule is to "reduce ... the uncertainty and the hazard assumed by a
litigant" who does not appeal from a potentially final judgment under Rule 54(b). For the full
quotation from Dickinson, see supra text accompanying note 116.
366. Kelly v. Lee's Old Fashioned Hamburgers, 908 F.2d 1218, 1221 (5th Cir. 1990) (en
banc). The majority also stated that "[c]ounsel should know that the district court has entered a
partial final judgment when the order alone or the order together with the motion or some other
portion of the record referred to in the order contains clear language reflecting the court's intent
to enter the judgment under Rule 54(b)." Id.
367. See supra note 352-64 (discussing the unmistakable intent standard).
368. Modern federal courts, especially those in the Fifth Circuit, have rejected a case-by-case
approach to finality both in the general finality context under section 1291, see In re Klein, 776
F.2d 628, 631 (7th Cir. 1985); Newpark Shipbldg. & Repair v. Roundtree, 723 F.2d 399, 405
(5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 818 (1984); and in the Rule 54(b) context, see
FSLIC. v. Tullos-Pierremont, 894 F.2d 1469, 1476 (5th Cir. 1990) ("We conclude that the rule of
Nagle ... is clearly preferable to making a case-by-case determination of [finality under Rule
54(b)].") (emphasis added).
369. For citation to cases adhering to the benefits of a bright-line approach to Rule 54(b), see
supra note 178.
370. See supra note 359 (discussing the practical problems with the case-by-case approach).
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clarity and predictability for litigants. 71
Nevertheless, the majority in Kelly baldly asserted that its "unmistakable
intent" standard has never before caused litigants problems in determining
when a partial final judgment was appealable. 72 This assertion is meaningless
because federal courts have never applied this standard before Kelly.878 The
"unmistakable intent" standard is, however, remarkably similar to the Rule
54(b) jurisprudence that existed prior to the 1946 Amendment. 74 Under the
original Rule, the district court had no duty to expressly state whether its
order was final for Rule 54(b) purposes.8 75 Furthermore, even if the court did
expressly state its intentions, the appellate court often set aside its interpreta-
tion.376 Consequently, litigants had no reliable way to determine whether a
district court's partial judgment was final under original Rule 54(b). 377 The
drafters of Rule 54(b) thus devised a bright-line test for finality because the
case-by-case method of determining finality under the Rule was ineffective. 78
The "unmistakable intent" approach can only lead to the same result. Since
the majority has removed the trigger of appealability under the Rule, 379 courts
and litigants can only determine how "unmistakable" the district court judge's
intent must be or how "related" it must be to the order itself on a case-by-case
basis.880 Consequently, as in practice under the original Rule, interested par-
ties will be faced with the same dilemma of having no dependable way of
determining if a partial judgment is final under Rule 54(b). Accordingly "hap-
less litigants" who attempt to discover whether to appeal a partial judgment
are thus once again left in "Never-Never-Land." '381
The impracticality of the "unmistakable intent" standard is exemplified by
the majority's attempt to justify its overruling of Mills v. Zapata Drilling
Co. 82 The majority overruled Mills because "[n]either the order appealed
371. See supra note 368.
372. Kelly v. Lee's Old Fashioned Hamburgers, 908 F.2d 1218, 1221 (5th Cir. 1990) (en
banc).
373. Although some courts have looked to the intent of the district court to determine finality
under Rule 54(b), see supra note 190, no federal circuit has adopted this standard and applied it
consistently.
374. Kelly, 908 F.2d at 1223 (Smith, J., dissenting).
375. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
376. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
377. See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
378. See FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) advisory committee's note ("It hardly seems a case where multi-
plicity of precedents will tend to remove the problem [of the lack of certainty) from debate.").
379. The court attempted to bury the importance of the "trigger" in a footnote by stating,
"Prudence might dictate use of what some view as the talismanic words of Rule 54(b), as at least
a nod to the wisdom of the adage 'an ounce of prevention' .... Kelly, 908 F.2d at 1221 n.2.
380. See supra note 359 (discussing the practical problems with the adoption of the unmistaka-
ble intent standard).
381. Kelly, 908 F.2d at 1223 (Smith, J., dissenting). Judge Smith asserted in his dissent that
litigants will be "hapless" in this "Never-Never-Land" because they will be in a state of wonder-
ment over whether they should take a protective appeal immediately or take the risk of losing the
right to appeal by waiting until after judgment on the remaining claims. Id.
382. 722 F.2d 1170 (5th Cir. 1983). For a more detailed discussion of Mills, see supra notes
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from nor related pleadings in the record recited Rule 54(b)." 8'83 The court
reasoned that Mills must be overruled because "the panel apparently inferred
the district court's intent to enter a final judgment from the posture of the case
and the circumstances surrounding the entry of judgment. 384
In interpreting this language, the majority in Kelly did not state that the
district court's intent was "unmistakable."385 Instead, the majority ruled that
the district court's "intent" was not contained in the "related record."3 8 Of
course, the court offered no reasons why the "posture of the case" and the
"circumstances surrounding the entry of judgment" were too far removed
from the order. Consequently, in the next case, where perhaps the "unmistaka-
ble intent" will be a little closer to the order, counsel will have no idea whether
that intent is part of the "related record. 387 The litigant will once again be
left in "Never-Never-Land."3 88 Clearly, by not recognizing the absurdity of
this type of Rule 54(b) jurisprudence, the majority has effectively eliminated
the value of the certification requirement that the drafters added in 1946.388
Under either a narrow or broad interpretation of the Kelly decision, the
language of Rule 54(b) becomes superfluous. Despite the explicit command in
the Rule to use the trigger phrase of "no just reason for delay," the "unmis-
takable intent" standard disregards this command and looks to the intent of
the district court. In addition, the purpose of Rule 54(b) is undermined by use
of the "unmistakable intent" standard. By looking in the order and the accom-
panying record for any indication of the district court's intent, the majority in
Kelly removes the certainty and clouds the clarity that amended Rule 54(b)
was intended to provide litigants and reviewing courts. Although these textual
arguments are persuasive, the impact of the standard used in Kelly provides
the most telling arguments for adherence to a bright-line approach utilizing
the trigger language present in Rule 54(b).
204-10 and accompanying text.
383. Kelly, 908 F.2d at 1221.
384. Id.
385. It is ironic that the majority, in discarding Mills, overruled one of the leading cases that
established the liberal approach to Rule 54(b), an approach that the majority now adopts.
386. Kelly, 908 F.2d at 1221. The court also stated in this instance that the district court's
intent was not in the "related pleadings." Id. This may or may not mean that the "unmistakable
intent" must be in the order or the pleadings, however the majority would define pleadings.
387. Perhaps the judge might orally announce that there is "no just reason for delay." Cer-
tainly, an argument could be made that the judge's statement, recorded in the transcript, would be
sufficiently related to a Rule 54(b) order.
388. See supra note 381 (discussing Judge Smith's dissent in Kelly in which he argues that the
majority's interpretation of Rule 54(b) will leave litigators unsure whether they should appeal
immediately or lose their right to appeal).
389. Judge Smith stated in his dissent that although the majority "pays lip service" to the 1946
Amendment's language, it has now "expunged what the Supreme Court added in 1946." Kelly,
908 F.2d at 1223 (Smith, J., dissenting).
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V. IMPACT
After the decision in Kelly, a district court no longer needs to include in its
Rule 54(b) order the specific phrase "no just reason for delay."3 90 The review-
ing court must assume that the district court determined that there was "no
just reason for delay" of appeal if the order or the related record evidences the
district court's unmistakable intent to issue a partial final judgment pursuant
to Rule 54(b).391 Presumably, some judges may choose to include the Rule's
language in their Rule 54(b) orders to make their intentions perfectly evi-
dent.392 However, where a district court feels that it has clearly manifested its
intent to issue a partial final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) in the related
record, the court may very well decide that it is mere surplus to include the
"no just reason for delay" language in its order. 9
Unfortunately, counsel faced with orders that do not contain the "no just
reason for delay" language will be in "Never-Never-Land." 394 Counsel will no
longer simply be able to look for specific language in the order to decide if
they should appeal it. They must instead try to determine "at their peril"'39
whether the district court unmistakably intended to issue a partial final judg-
ment pursuant to Rule 54(b). 9 ' If counsel decide that the court did not intend
to do so and are wrong, they will lose the right to appeal the order on its
merits and may face malpractice actions from their clients.3 97 Most attorneys,
in order to avoid this harsh result, will decide to "err on the side of caution"3"
and appeal any order that could potentially be final under Rule 54(b).3 99 This
multitude of protective appeals will have several adverse effects on federal
practice, including: 1) an increase in the time and cost of federal litigation; 2)
an increase in the use of Rule 38 sanctions against attorneys; and 3) an in-
crease in the caseload of already overcrowded appellate court dockets4 00
390. Id. at 908 F.2d at 1220.
391. Id.
392. The majority somewhat suggested this in a footnote by stating that '[p]rudence might
dictate use of what some would view as the talismanic words of Rule 54(b), as at least a nod in
the wisdom of the adage 'an ounce of prevention.'" Id. at 1221, n.2.
393. The majority clearly implied that the language "no just reason for delay" was mere sur-
plusage. Id. at 1220 ("We do not now require the judge to mechanically recite the words 'no just
reason on for delay.' ").
394. Id. at 1227 (Smith, J., dissenting).
395. See MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 16, 1 54.23[1] ("The losing party . . .was
required to determine finality at his peril.").
396. Kelly, 908 F.2d at 1221.
397. See infra notes 407-12 and accompanying text (noting that the Kelly decision may force
attorneys to appeal almost any order that potentially disposes less than all the claims or parties in
order to avoid being held for malpractice).
398. MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra noite 16, 54.23[1].
399. See infra note 413 and accompanying text (noting that attorneys will "err on the side of
caution" instead of facing potential malpractice charges).
400. See infra notes 413-35 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of Kelly on counsel,
litigants, and the appellate dockets).
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A. Decision Not to Appeal
Inevitably, some attorneys will decide not to immediately appeal orders that
may potentially dispose of less than all claims or parties and that do not con-
tain the phrase "no just reason for delay." Counsel instead may wait until the
entire litigation is adjudicated before they appeal the order on its merits. This
may lead to two dreadful consequences.
First, if counsel does not immediately appeal an order that the reviewing
court later finds was in fact a partial final judgment under Rule 54(b), the
party will lose its right to appeal.4 0' 28 U.S.C. § 2107 unambiguously states
that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section, no appeal shall bring any
judgment, order or decree in an action . . . of a civil nature before a court of
appeals unless notice of appeal is filed, within thirty days after entry of judg-
ment."4 °2 The filing of a notice of appeal within 30 days under this rule is
mandatory. 0 3 It is well settled that the courts of appeals must dismiss un-
timely appeals.404 Since the time for appeal of a partial final judgment issued
pursuant to Rule 54(b) begins to run at the entry of the order,408 a reviewing
court certainly will dismiss any appeal of such an order not filed until after the
entire trial.406 Accordingly, counsel who erroneously conclude that a district
court did not intend to issue a partial final judgment under Rule 54(b) will in
essence forfeit the rights of their clients to appeal the order on its merits.
This erroneous guess described above also could lead to another harsh con-
sequence for counsel: an attorney malpractice suit by a client for negligently
failing to protect the client's right to appeal. Previous courts have held that
negligence of an attorney in failing to take proper steps to protect a client's
right of appeal is actionable.40 7 For example, in Pete v. Henderson,4"0 a Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals found that Henderson was liable to his client, Pete,
for the fee which Pete had paid him. 09 The court also held that the attorney
401. 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (1988).
402. Id. (emphasis added).
403. Richard Knox Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kallen, 376 F.2d 360, 363 (6th Cir. 1967).
404. See, e.g., Gunther v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 255 F.2d 710, 715 (4th Cir. 1988)
("[U]nless appeal is taken within [30 days from entry of judgment,] the court of appeals is with-
out jurisdiction to entertain it ... and must dismiss it on its own motion."); Lathrop v. Oklahoma
City Hous. Auth., 438 F.2d 914, 915 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 840 (1971) (dismissing
untimely appeal despite the fact that timely post-trial motion was denied without notice to
parties).
405. See 10 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 19, § 2654, at 39 (2d ed., 1983) ("[T]he time for
appeal begins to run from the entry of an order that meets the requirements of the Rule.").
406. MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 16, 54.2311].
407. Pete v. Henderson, 269 P.2d 78 (1954); see In re Kruger's Estate, 63 P. 31 (Cal. 1900);
see also Jack Leavitt, The Attorney as Defendant, 13 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 23-24 (1961) ("On proper
proof, an attorney is negligent for ... failing to observe the required procedures for obtaining a
new trial or perfecting an appeal."); 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorney at Law § 204 (1980) ("Negligence of
an attorney failing to take proper steps to protect his client's right to appeal has been held action-
able where, as a result, the right of appeal was lost.").
408. 269 P.2d 78 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954).
409. Id. at 80.
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would be liable for any other damage that the plaintiff could prove was "proxi-
mately and directly caused" by counsel's failure to protect his appeal.410 While
it is often difficult for a client to establish that an attorney's malpractice proxi-
mately caused him damage,'411 the decisions in this area are often quite unpre-
dictable.4 12 Consequently, the consequences of counsel's erroneous decision as
to the finality of a district court's Rule 54(b) order may extend far beyond the
actual litigation in which it arises.
B. Decision to Appeal
Due to the harsh consequences that may accompany counsel's decision not
to appeal a potentially final district court order, most attorneys will decide to
"err on the side of caution" and appeal almost any court order that potentially
disposes less than all claims or parties."1 " These prospective appeals will have
several adverse effects on litigants, attorneys, and federal court dockets.
1. Effect on Litigants
The practice of taking precautionary appeals could have two rather severe
effects on litigants in federal litigation. First, the length of a complex civil trial
will be drastically increased due to the number of piecemeal appeals."1 This
development could realistically delay the ultimate disposition of complex trials
by several years.' 15 Considering that trials in federal court are already im-
mensely time consuming,416 many more litigants will be adversely impacted by
the length of federal litigation.""
410. Id. at 79.
411. This is perhaps the greatest obstacle to a plaintiff in a malpractice suit. The plaintiff in
this situation would have to prove that the judgment would have been reversed by the reviewing
court had the appeal been perfected. See, e.g., Kilmer v. Carr, 274 Cal. App. 2d 81, 82, 78 Cal.
Rptr. 800, 803 (1956) (affirming judgment for defendant attorney affirmed despite his failure to
file appellate brief because plaintiff had not proved that he would have prevailed on appeal if the
brief would have been filed). For a more detailed discussion of the problems that face a plaintiff in
an attorney malpractice action, see William W. Schwarzer, Dealing with Incompetent Coun-
sel-The Trial Judge's Role, 93 HARV. L. REV. 633, 646-49 (1980).
412. See Leavitt, supra note 407, at 24-37. Of course, the time, cost, and potential damage to
professional reputation are other negative aspects of malpractice litigation for attorneys.
413. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (illustrating that most litigants, when faced
with this dilemma in practice under the original Rule, chose to take precautionary appeals).
414. See supra note 28 (noting the adverse effects of piecemeal litigation).
415. Between July, 1985 and June, 1986, the median time interval between the filing of a
notice of appeal and the disposition of the appeal was 10.8 months. L. RALPH MEECHAM, ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 153
(1986).
416. Between July, 1985, and June 1986, the median time interval from the filing of a civil suit
until ultimate disposition of a trial (for those case that resulted in a jury trial) was 19 months. Id.
at 233. However, the median time frame for the longest 10% of the trials, where Rule 54(b) is
primarily used, was 47 months. Id.
417. Experts were well aware of these potential evils that accompany piecemeal appeals. See
supra notes 108-113 and accompanying text (discussing the intent of the Supreme Court commit-
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Another adverse effect that precautionary appeals will have on litigants in
federal court is that the cost of a trial will escalate. Intuitively, the cost of
federal litigation would not only rise dramatically because of the increased
length of trial, but also because of the extra costs involved in preparing the
multitude of piecemeal appeals. The practice of taking precautionary appeals
to protect against losing the right of appeal under the unpredictable "unmis-
takable intent" standard will thus substantially increase the burden on liti-
gants in federal court.
2. Effect on Counsel
In addition to the increased burdens of time and cost piecemeal appeals will
impose on litigants, counsel may also be adversely affected if they "err on the
side of caution." Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, the appellate rule's
counterpart to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11,418 unequivocally states, "If
a court of appeals shall determine that an appeal is frivolous, it may award
just damages and single or double costs to the appellee.""19 Under Rule 38, a
court of appeals may sanction either the attorney, the client, or both.420
Like modern federal courts' expanded use of Rule 1 1, '21 appellate courts are
tee organized to amend Rule 54(b)). Ironically, the final judgment rule, and the amended Rule
54(b), are designed to prevent this very result. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text
(discussing the purpose of amended Rule 54(b)).
418. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 states in pertinent part:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the
signer has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of the signer's
knowledge, information and belief formed after reasonable inquiry is well grounded in
fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for reversal of existing
law, and that it is interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation .... If a pleading,
motion or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or its
own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it ... an appropriate sanction,
which may include an order to pay the other party or parties the reasonable expenses
incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a
reasonable attorney fee.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
419. FED. R. App. P. 38. Courts often cite 28 U.S.C. § 1912 in conjunction with Rule 38.
Section 1912 states in pertinent part that "[w]here a judgment is affirmed by ...a court of
appeals, the court may in its determination adjudge to the prevailing party just damages for delay,
and single or double costs." 28 U.S.C. § 1912 (1988). One court has explained that the difference
between Rule 38 and section 1912 is that "[section] 1912 damages are imposed essentially for
delay" while "damages under Rule [38] may be imposed if an appeal is frivolous without a show-
ing that the appeal resulted in delay." Maneikis v. Jordan, 678 F.2d 720, 721 n.5 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 990 (1982).
420. Mays v. Chicago Sun Times, 865 F.2d 134, 139 (7th Cir. 1989); see Bradley v. Campbell,
832 F.2d 1504, 1511 (10th Cir. 1987) (" 'Attorneys can be held jointly and severally liable with
their clients under Rule 38 for bringing a frivolous appeal.' ") (quoting Bartel Dental Books Co. v.
Schultz, 786 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1986)).
421. The widespread use of Rule 11 is well documented. See, e.g., Bradley, 832 F.2d at 1510
n.4 (commenting on the increased use of Rule 11); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory commit-
tee's note (commanding federal courts to expand the use of Rule 11 to enforce sanctions against
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increasingly willing to impose Rule 38 sanctions on attorneys who file frivolous
appeals."22 Courts of appeals have sanctioned attorneys for filing an appeal
from a nonfinal order. '23 In Maneikis v. Jordan,'24 Jordan agreed to volunta-
rily dismiss a counterclaim in exchange for the plaintiff's promise to forego
certain discovery.425 The court accordingly dismissed the counterclaim. Never-
theless, Jordan later moved to reinstate the same counterclaim. 26 The district
court denied the motion and Jordan appealed. 27
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of juris-
diction. It held that the trial court's dismissal of Jordan's counterclaim was
obviously not final "since the court never directed the entry of judgment or
made the required certification" under Rule 54(b). 42 8 Accordingly, the court
decided that Rule 38 sanctions were appropriate in that case because the de-
fendant's appeal was frivolous,'429 and because of the disregard of the jurisdic-
tional requirement by Jordan's attorney. 430
Additionally, unlike Rule 11 where sanctions are usually limited to attorney
fees and costs, Rule 38 allows for damages as well as double costs."" Courts of
appeals have not hesitated to impose extremely harsh sanctions on attorneys
who file frivolous appeals.3 2 Consequently, federal practitioners may pay a
attorneys under appropriate circumstances).
422. See, e.g., In re Hartford Textile Corp., 659 F.2d 299, 303 n.l I (2d Cir. 1981) (citing eight
cases where Rule 38 sanctions had recently been imposed). Generally, an appeal is frivolous if the
result is obvious and the appellant's argument is completely without merit. Mays, 865 F.2d at
138.
423. See, e.g., Maneikis, 678 F.2d at 722 (imposing Rule 38 sanctions against appellant for
appealing an order not certified under Rule 54(b)); Self v. Self, 614 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir.
1980) (finding appeal frivolous because "review of applicable jurisprudence" showed that court of
appeals lacked jurisdiction); Mancuso v. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R., 586 F.2d 553 (7th Cir. 1978)
(sanctioning appellant because it was "crystal clear" that the order was not final).
424. 678 F.2d 720 (7th Cir. 1982).
425. Id. at 721.
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Id. at 722 ("The appellant ... makes only the most perfunctory attempt to demonstrate
his compliance with that essential threshold [finality] requirement, (and] [u]nder these circum-
stances, we find the appeal frivolous.").
430. Id. The court decided, however, that it would be "more purposeful to assess damages and
costs . . . against the attorney pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1957." Id. at 723 n.8.
431. The committee comments to Rule 38 state that "damages are awarded by the court in its
discretion ... as a matter of justice to the appellee and as a penalty against the appellant. FED. R.
Civ. P. 38 advisory committee's comments; see also In re Hartford Textile Co., 659 F.2d at 303
n.9 ("The determination [to impose sanctions] is one of doing justice between the parties [and] of
penalizing a party for unnecessarily wasting the time and resources of the court.").
432. See, e.g., Bankers Trust Co. v. Publisher Indus., 641 F.2d 1361, 1368 (2d Cir. 1981)
(assessing double costs and $410,000 in damages against appellant and its attorney); Oscar Gruss
& Son v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 422 F.2d 1278, 1284-85 (2d Cir. 1970) (imposing an
additional four percent interest on judgment, double costs, and $722,500 in attorney fees on
appellant).
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steep price for taking precautionary appeals to protect against losing their
right to review.
3. Effect on Appellate Dockets
The increased number of protective appeals could also have a severe effect
on the already overcrowded appellate dockets.433 As the majority's case-by-
case approach commands, courts of appeals will be required to conduct a com-
prehensive review of each partial appeal to determine whether the trial court
unmistakably intended to issue a partial final judgment pursuant to Rule
54(b).43 4 Consequently, valuable judicial resources will consistently be wasted
as reviewing courts sift through each record to ascertain the lower court's in-
tent.4 35 Accordingly, the majority's new substance-over-form approach will
only add to overcrowded appellate docket concerns.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Kelly v. Lee's Old Fashioned Hamburgers,430 the Fifth Circuit attempted
to clarify how a district court may properly certify a partial final judgment
order under Rule 54(b) and what language a district court must include in its
order. The majority adopted a "substance-over-form" approach and formu-
lated an unmistakable intent standard.437 The majority's new approach com-
mands that although Rule 54(b) states that a district court can only issue a
Rule 54(b) order by making an "express determination that there is no just
reason for delay" of appeal,438 no particular language need be included in the
court's order.439 Instead, the order will be appealable if either the related
433. Modern courts have become increasingly aware of the problem of overcrowded appellate
court dockets. See e.g., Hensley v. Eckerheart, 461 U.S. 424, 454-55 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) ("Paragraph-by-paragraph scrutiny of the explanations for specific exercises of the district
court's broad discretion ... exacerbates the myriad of problems of crowded appellate dockets.");
Coopers v. Lybrand, 437 U.S. 463, 475 n.24 (1977) (citing H.R. REP. No. 1667, 85th. Cong., 2d
Sess., 5-6 (1958)) ("Avoidance of ill-founded applications in the Courts of Appeals for piecemeal
review is of particular concern [to] crowded appellate dockets."); Van Duran v. Elrod, 760 F.2d
756, 761 (7th Cir. 1985) (recognizing the problem of overcrowded appellate dockets).
434. See supra note 356 and accompanying text (discussing how under the unmistakable intent
standard, courts are now forced to look through the entire record for anything that might evidence
the district court's intent to issue a Rule 54(b) partial final judgment). Of course, the court of
appeals must then determine if the trial court abused its discretion in deciding that there was no
just reason for delay. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (noting that in Curtiss-Wright,
the Court explicitly held that an appellate court has the duty to review the district court's decision
that there was no "just reason for delay").
435. See supra note 160 (noting that the Court in Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co.,
446 U.S. 1, 10 (1980), held that an appellate court has the duty to review the factors that the trial
court found relevant to certifying a Rule 54(b) order).
436. 908 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
437. Id. at 1220.
438. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
439. Kelly, 908 F.2d at 1220.
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record, or the order itself reflects the court's unmistakable intent to issue a
partial final judgment pursuant to the rule.44 0
This Note has attempted to illustrate that the legal reasoning of the major-
ity in Kelly was flawed. The majority has violated the plain meaning rule of
statutory construction by ignoring the explicit language of the Rule.44 1 More
importantly, it has disrupted the Rule 54(b) framework by creating a disin-
centive for district courts to carefully consider the factors relevant to its deter-
mination that there is "no just reason for delay.' 4 2 Most egregiously, how-
ever, the majority's "unmistakable intent" standard has read the very purpose
of the certification requirement right out of the Rule.44 3
The majority's misconstruction of Rule 54(b)'s language and purpose may
have a serious adverse effect on complex civil litigation in federal court. The
potentially harsh consequences facing counsel who do not appeal orders that
dispose less than all claims or parties44 4 will likely force attorneys to take pre-
cautionary appeals. 445 These piecemeal appeals will lead to an increase in
length and cost of litigation,4 4 6 in the number of Rule 38 sanctions against
counsel, 447 and in the burden on appellate court dockets. 4"
The framers of the 1946 amendment to Rule 54(b) added the certification
requirement to prevent these consequential evils. 4 9 Subsequent courts recog-
nized the Rule's effectiveness and its preservation of the traditional policy
against piecemeal appeals.450 In adopting its new "unmistakable intent" stan-
dard, the Kelly majority has swept aside a policy formulated hundreds of
years ago to prevent relatively simple litigation from becoming complex. To-
day, where civil litigation is ordinarily long and complex, the results of the
majority holding could prove to be extremely harsh. In essence, the Kelly deci-
sion has set practice under Rule 54(b) back forty-five years: back to the pre-
1946 era.
William J. Serritella, Jr.
440. Id.
441. See supra notes 346-51, 354-64 and accompanying text (noting the manner in which the
majority in Kelly ignored the express language of the Rule).
442. See supra notes 338-44 and accompanying text (discussing the effects on district courts of
not requiring use of Rule 54(b)'s literal language).
443. See supra notes 365-89 and accompanying text (noting that the majority decision in Kelly
does injustice to the purpose of the certification requirement in Rule 54(b)).
444. These consequences are: (1) the loss of the party's right to appeal; and (2) a malpractice
suit from the lawyer's client. See supra notes 401-12 and accompanying text.
445. See supra text accompanying note 413.
446. See supra text accompanying notes 414-17.
447. See supra notes 418-32 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 38).
448. See supra notes 433-35 and accompanying text (noting that the increased number of pro-
tecting appeals waste valuable judicial resources).
449. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (listing the purposes of the amendment to
Rule 54(b)).
450. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 438 (1956) ("The amended rule
preserves the historic federal policy against piecemeal appeals ... in many cases more effectively
that did the original rule.").
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